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INTRODUCTION
The power juries wield over civil verdicts has caused concern in
recent decades. Critics claim that unpredictable jury verdicts have
undermined confidence in our civil justice system.1 Many remedies
have been proposed. Some advocate more vigorous use of summary
judgment, or limits on awards-especially punitive damages-or
greater use of mediation and arbitration.2 Some even recommend
abolishing the civil jury in certain types of cases.? This Article will
explore the history of a method of jury guidance that is both rooted
in tradition and respectful ofjuries' power: judicial comment on the
evidence.4
Much has been made of the independence of juries in America's
early history. But it is not so well understood that this formal inde-
pendence coexisted with a large amount ofinformal influence by the
judge on the jury.5 Judicial comment on the evidence was one of
these informal practices, and has deep roots in our legal traditions.
1. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and EconomicAnalysis,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 73, 74-75 (arguing that "[since juries receive
minimum guidance from judges, awards are unpredictable"); Franklin Strier, Making Jury
Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 163 & n.270 (1996) (claiming that American
commerce is perceived to be hampered as a result of unpredictable jury damages).
2. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes
in Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 988-95, 1030-33 (1998) (advocating more vigorous
use of summary judgment to cure jury unpredictability); Russel Myles & Kelly Reese,
Arbitration:Avoiding the Runaway Jury, 23 AMl. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 129, 142-43 (1999); Jason
Micah Ross, Note, 'Baseball Litigation":" A New Calculus for Awarding Damages in Tort
Trials, 78 TEX. L. REV. 439 (1999) (arguing that jury damage awards are inconsistent and
proposing"baseball litigation" as a reform). The concern about punitive damages is especially
strong. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("[J]uries assess
punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the
actual harm caused."); John Calvin Jefrzies, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of
Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (1986) (contending that "the American civil
liability system is approachinga crisis"); Cass R. Sunstein et al.,AssessingPunitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2077-78 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Abolition of Jury Trials in Patent Cases, 34 IDEA 77 (1994); JosefAthanas,
The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials in Will Contests, 1990 U. CEM. LEGAL F. 529, 530-31.
4. Throughout this Article, "comment" refers to the practice of the trial judge giving his
opinion on the facts at any point during the trial. "Summing up" or"summation" refers to the
trial judge summarizing the facts at the end of a trial. It should be noted that restrictions on
comment tend to have a chilling effect on all judicial interaction with the jury, including
summing up evidence.
5. See Rende B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in
Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 522-23, 527-29 (1996).
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It was widely used in America for some time after the founding. In
several states and in the federal courts, it remained vigorous into
the twentieth century.6 The practice grew out of the English courts,
which continued to exercise the power to comment until the
abolition of civil juries in England after the First World War.
Several seminal thinkers about the American legal system
believed that the judge's ability to comment on evidence was crucial
to the proper functioning ofjuries, especially civil juries. Tocqueville
stressed how important it was in civil cases that the judge help to
guide the jury: "It is he who unravels the various arguments they
are finding it so hard to remember and takes them by the hand
to guide them through procedural intricacies."7 He acts as "a
disinterested arbitrator between the litigants' passions."'
Comments from the judge performed two important functions
according to Tocqueville: They helped to ensure that justice was
done and they served to educate jurors in the responsibilities of
government.9 "[Tihe judge's advice," together with the lawyers'
arguments and even the passions of the litigants, helped to give the
6. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed federal district courts' power to
comment on evidence, the leading case being Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
There, the Court stated:
It is within [the district court's] province, whenever he thinks it necessary, to
assist the jury in arriving at a just conclusion by explaining and commenting
upon the evidence, by drawing their attention to the parts of it which he thinks
important; and he may express his opinion upon the facts, provided he makes
it clear to the jury that all matters of fact are submitted to their determination.
Id. at 469. The Supreme Court has warned, however, that judges should be cautious in
expressing an opinion on the ultimate fact of guilt in a criminal case. See United States v.
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933). Today, use of the power to comment on evidence is highly
controversial. Some federal circuits have limited the district court's power more strictly,
apparently contradicting Quercia. See, e.g., Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772,
780 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Comments by the judge require reversal if the judge expresses his
opinion on an ultimate issue of fact in front of the jury ... ."). My colleague Stephen
Saltzburg has opposed judicial powers of comment, while Judge Jack Weinstein supports
such powers. Compare Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the
American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 35-46 (1978), with Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and
Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall and Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some
Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161 (1988).
7. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George
Lawrence trans., Harper Perennial 1988) (1840).
8. Id.
9. See id.
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jury "practical lessons in the law" so important in a democracy.' °
Indeed, Tocqueville says that for these reasons, the jury should be
regarded as a "free school" for democracy."
The gradual loss of the judges' power to give such advice was of
great concern to some later observers. In the beginning of the
twentieth century, John Wigmore wrote that the loss of judicial
power to comment on evidence "has done more than any other one
thing to impair the general efficiency ofjury trial as an instrument
of justice." 2 If the power were restored, he predicted "[a] new birth
of long life will then be open for the great and beneficent institution
of Trial by Jury."3
This Article will describe how this important power of judicial
comment on the evidence was used earlier in our history and how
it was lost. It was lost, the Article will propose, on a regional basis.
Southern and western states led the way before the Civil War in
restricting judges' ability to comment. Fortunately, legal historians
have shown a growing appreciation of the role of regional
differences in shaping law.'4 Regional distinctiveness is important,
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. 5 JOHN HENRYWIGMORE, ATREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2551, at 557 (2d ed. 1923).
13. Id.
14. Previously, regional differences had not been emphasized. Partly, this was because
legal historians' work tended to focus on northern states, where records are better. An
exception was a recognition of the importance of western states in the spread of the Field
Code and codification generally. See, e.g., CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION
MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981). Western legal history is
beginning to get more attention. See, e.g., LAw FOR THE ELEPHANT, LAW FOR THE BEAVER:
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE NORTH AMERICAN WEST (John McLaren et al. eds.,
1992). Work on southern legal history tended to concentrate on one state at a time, making
broader comparisons difficult. That, however, is also beginning to change. James Ely,
Kermit Hall, James Bodenhamer, and Paul Finkelman have played important roles in
encouraging work on the legal history of the South. See AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL
HISTORY OF THE SOUTH (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1984); AN
UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM ANDTHE HISTORYOFTHE SOUTH (Kermit L. Hall
& James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989); James W. Ely, Jr. & David J. Bodenhamer, Regionalism and
American Legal History: The Southern Experience, 39 VAND. L. REV. 539 (1986); Paul
Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77 (1985); see also MICHAEL
STEPHEN HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND AUTHORITY IN
MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878 (1980). Timothy Huebner has recently
focused on southern judges. See TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIALTRADITION:
STATE JUDGES AND SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790-1890 (1999). Huebner's work is a
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and highlights the part that legal and social culture play in
delineating the role of the judge, jury, and lawyers-in that or in any
other time. Certain social and political conditions make it very
difficult for a judge to take the jury "by the hand" to guide them,
after the arguments of counsel. 5 If these conditions exist today, and
it is not possible for judges to give meaningful guidance, we might
well consider whether civil juries are worth the trouble. Jurors are
denied the benefit of dispassionate advice from the judge, thus
limiting the value of the "free school" of civil jury service." And not
least, jury awards are likely to remain unpredictable.
Historians and legal scholars have not examined the loss of
judicial power to comment on evidence in much depth, despite its
importance to the functioning of jury trials.17 This most likely
sensitive series of portraits of prominent southern judges, drawing mainly on appellate
opinions and judges' papers. The book is part of a new series entitled "Studies in the Legal
History of the South," edited by Paul Finkelman and Kermit L. Hall. Peter Karsten has also
recognized the importance of regionalism in the development of law, arguing that
northeastern judges tended to follow a jurisprudence of the "Head," while southerners and
westerners were more inclined to follow their "Heart." PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS
HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 77, 306-12 (1997).
15. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 7, at 275.
16. See id.
17. The onlyreasonably thorough effort in the late twentieth centuryto dealwith the loss
of American judges' power to comment on evidence is a piece by Kenneth Krasity in the mid-
1980s. See Kenneth A. Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The Elimination of
Judicial Evaluation of Fact in American State Courts from 1795 to 1913, 62 U. DET. L. REV.
595 (1985). He tentatively proposes the "division of functions" explanation described infra.
See id. at 621. Others have simply noted the change. Friedman, for instance, laments the loss
of clarity and metaphor caused by "hamstringing" the judge, but points out that these
restrictions did further jury autonomy. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAw 155 (2d ed. 1985). The importance of losing this judicial power was far better
recognized earlier in the century. A roster of heavy-hitting historians mourned the loss of
judges' comments on evidence, without going into detail about why that loss might have
occurred. See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS 97 (1950) (noting in passing that this loss had the effect of empowering lawyers);
ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CVIL PROCEDURE OFTHE TRIAL COURTINHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
310-11 (1952); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 188 n.2 (Augustus M. Kelly Publishers 1969) (1898) (noting the "separate
spheres" principle); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2551, at 557. For a time, the Journal of the
American Judicature Society put some emphasis on this issue, and a few of its pieces placed
the blame squarely on lawyers. See George M. Hogan, The Strangled Judge, 14 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC'Y 116 (1930); Kenneth M. Johnson, Province ofthe Judge in Jury Trials, 12
J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 76 (1928). One early writer, arguing that "no single reform would
have so wide-reaching and wholesome an effect" on procedure as a return to the common law
practice permittingjudicial comment on evidence, noted that the movement was indigenous
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reflects the greater attention paid to the history of substantive law
compared to the history of procedure, 8 and the difficulty of
understanding informal practices such as comment on the evidence.
To the extent there has been any investigation of the subject,
scholars have tended to suggest two broad reasons for the loss of
the power to comment. First, loss of the power is thought to be a
natural outcome of division of functions between judge andjury into
separate spheres, with the judge deciding the law and the jury the
facts. 9 Second, populist tendencies associated with Jacksonian
democracy are said to have encouraged such limitations on the
judges' power.20 These limitations included popular election of
judges as well as prohibitions on comment.
There is truth to both explanations, although the story is more
interesting than that. Both of these reasons leave out the important
role of regional differences in determining whether judges retained
or lost the power.2 The two explanations above would seem to be
valid in many parts of America before the Civil War, whereas in
fact judges lost the power almost exclusively in the South and West
during this period. Certain conditions in the South and West seem
to the South. Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency ofthe American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REV.
302, 307-08, 316 (1915).
18. This lack of emphasis on the history of procedure is especially regrettable because,
as Holmes pointed out, procedural law is more dependent on past arrangements than
substantive law. "The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so
far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery,
and the degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its
past." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 1963)
(1881). There have been and are now some first-rate legal historians interested in the history
of procedure and institutions, such as John Dawson, James Hurst, John Langbein, William
Nelson, and Daniel Ernst.
19. See, e.g., THAYER, supra note 17, at 188 n.2; Krasity, supra note 17, at 621.
20. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the
Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Ahl. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 193 (1993).
21. George Fisher has discovered a regional pattern of change in other procedural rules
in the nineteenth century: allowing sworn testimony by criminal defendants and testimony
by civil parties. See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as LieDetector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 667-73
(1997). In both of these cases, he notes that the North was in the vanguard of change and
convincingly argues that the reason the South was reluctant to adopt reforms has to do with
rules barring testimony by nonwhite people in the South. See id. at 673-76. Similarly, this
Article argues that the South (and West) were in the forefront of change prohibiting judges
to comment on evidence because of social and political differences in those areas. As Fisher
suggests, neither region should be viewed as more "reformist" overall than the other. See id.
at 670-71.
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to have made these areas more likely to restrict judges' power by
prohibiting comment.
First, in many parts of the South and West, governmental or
official authority, such as that of judges, was little respected.
Physical and verbal violence abounded, and the courtroom was no
exception. Coupled with this violence and disdain for official
authority was a fierce independence and faith in "plain common
sense," as opposed to legal learning or traditions such as the judge
commenting on evidence. Sometimes judges themselves were
physically or verbally violent, and shared the common perception
that legal learning and traditions were pedantic and useless. Such
an atmosphere did not encourage judges to calmly comment on
evidence, even if they wanted to.
Second, the legal profession was different in the South and West.
It is important to remember that judges and juries are not the
only players where judicial powers such as comment on evidence
are concerned. Lawyers stand to gain more control over a trial
if the judge is prevented from exercising such powers.22 The
"separate spheres" and "democratic populism" arguments described
above tend to obscure this point. Lawyers in the antebellum South
and West for the most part seem to have been extremely aggressive
and jealous of courtroom control. They were fully as physically
22. This point was well understood by commentators in an era when judicial comment
on evidence was still used, and could be contrasted with thosejurisdictions where the judge's
role was more sharply limited. See Hogan, supra note 17; Johnson, supra note 17. The
differing interests of lawyers and strong judges have often been overlooked. In part, this may
be because historians such as Morton Horwitz have tended to lump lawyers and judges
together as part of a monolithic monied elite, and have failed to make more subtle
distinctions between the two. Horwitz's influence has of course been great. To mention but
one example, directly relevant to the inquiry here, see Kenneth Krasity's citation of Horwitz
for the statement that "[plowerful elements of the bar and merchant community formed a
coalition interested in limiting the jury and strengthening the judiciary." Krasity, supra note
17, at 610 (citing MORTON J. HoRWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OFAMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,
at 141 (1977)). Horwitz is not alone; Roscoe Pound was also guilty of lumping the bench and
bar together inappropriately. See ROsCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITYTO MODERN
TIMES (1953). In part, this downplaying of the different interests may be the result of a focus
on substantive law, with its great questions ofjudicial review and the countermajoritarian
difficulty. Lawyers as a group are not necessarily opposed to powers such asjudicial review;
they may well welcome the opportunity to persuade ajudge to exercise this sort of authority.
But trial procedure is more of a zero-sum game between the lawyers and the judge. The more
important the role of the judge, the less important that of the lawyers. This is evident to
those who are familiar with trials in an inquisitorial system.
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violent as their nonlawyer peers, and even more given to abusive
language. They reveled in the culture of passionate rhetoric prev-
alent at the time. They were entrepreneurial and independent of
court control in the matter of fees. Perhaps most importantly, they
were deeply involved in politics and partisan struggles, to a greater
extent than their northern counterparts. This gave them (or a
significant number of them) power in the legislatures and
constitutional conventions to put in place prohibitions on judicial
comment-comment that could interfere with their efforts to sway
the jury.
The Article draws on a wide variety of nineteenth-century
sources to clarify how comment on the evidence was used, and the
reasons for its loss. These sources include treatises, appellate
opinions, trial court records, 23 reports of debates in state con-
stitutional conventions, legal periodicals, newspapers, memoirs, and
letters of lawyers and judges. In addition, the Article employs a
range of secondary material from the legal and historical fields.
The Article will begin in Part I by describing how judicial
comment on the evidence worked in the early nineteenth century,
and the reasons why it was considered important. Most American
judges followed the English style of an informal, close relationship
with the jury. They freely commented on evidence, and appellate
courts rarely interfered.
In Part II, the Article turns to the question of how the power was
lost. That part first considers the thesis that judicial elections were
closely linked to the movement to prohibit comment, and concludes
that such a link did not exist except in parts of the South and West.
Part II then discusses the distinct legal and social culture of the
South and West to help explain the curtailing of judges' power. The
Article describes the extraordinary atmosphere of southern and
23. For the purposes of this topic, trial court records turned out to add little information
beyond what was reported in appellate opinions. The report of the case contained in the
appellate opinion was often simply copied verbatim from the trial judge's or counsel's report,
which was usually the only source of information about the judge's charge to the jury in the
trial court records. If the trial judge wrote the report, counsel examined it before it went to
the appellate court; if counsel wrote the report, the trial judge examined it. Sometimes these
reports were thorough, sometimes not. Before the Civil War, there were no court
stenographers taking down a verbatim transcript of proceedings; the technology first came
into use in courtrooms shortly after the war. See infra note 343 and accompanying text.
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western courtrooms, permeated with rowdiness, violence, insults,
and passionate rhetoric from the lawyers. This milieu made it very
difficult for ajudge to assert control by means of unruffled comment
on evidence. The aggressive southern and western legal professions
are considered and contrasted with their more traditional northern
counterparts.
Part III then builds on this groundwork by describing exactly how
change occurred in the southern and western states. That part gives
details of the specific legislative and constitutional provisions
adopted and the debates surrounding them-debates that were
conducted almost exclusively by lawyers and that reflect the
cultural factors discussed earlier. Part III also discusses how courts
reacted to these legislative and constitutional provisions, and
concludes that courts in the end put heavier emphasis on the
expensive, formal remedy of new trial.
The conclusion compares our legal and social culture today with
that of the South and West before the Civil War. This is a step
toward ascertaining what the role of the judge might be today,
including whether it is even possible to resurrect judicial comment
on evidence.
I. JUDICIAL POWER TO COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE IN
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA
A. Following in English Footsteps: Informal Control of Juries
Early American judges understood the influence English judges
had over the jury concerning questions of fact, and for the most
part, they copied it as best they could. It is hard for us today, with
our rigid rules governing speaking in the courtroom, to picture how
close and informal the relationship between English judges and
juries was in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.24
Comments and questions continually went back and forth between
them at trial.
The English judges had at their disposal many means of
influencing the jury, but chief among them was the power to
24. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 285 (1978).
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comment on the evidence. Matthew Hale described the trial judge's
power in the seventeenth century:
Herein he is able in Matters of Law emerging upon the
Evidence to direct them; and also, in Matters of Fact, to give
them a great Light and Assistance by his weighing the Evidence
before them, and observing where the Question and Knot of the
Business lies, and by sh[olwing them his Opinion even in
matter of Fact, which is a great Advantage and Light to Lay-
men.2
After Bushell's Case, jurors could no longer be imprisoned for
finding a verdict against the judge's wishes. 26 But judges found
other means that were almost as effective-jurors could be cajoled,
argued to, reasoned with, influenced informally even before
instructions, and sent out to deliberate again if their proposed
verdict was not to the judge's liking.27 The result was that the jury
very often followed the judge's lead.2" Judges viewed verdicts as the
fruit of a partnership between judge and jury, and there was no
doubt as to who was the senior partner.29 To be sure, English judges
acknowledged the traditional division of labor between judges and
juries: Judges were to determine the law and juries to decide the
facts. 0 But English judges had so much influence over jury fact
25. MATrHEWHALE, THE HISTORYOFTHECOMMONLAWOFENGLAND 164-65 (Charles M.
Gray ed., The University of Chicago Press 1971) (1713).
26. 1 Vaughan 135, 146-47, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1011-12 (C.P. 1670).
27. See Langbein, supra note 24, at 284, 300.
28. See id. at 285.
29. Bryce gives the flavor of the judges' position in English society and the state, which
had not changed from the eighteenth century-
For some centuries Englishmen have associated the ideas ofpower, dignity, and
intellectual eminence with the judicial office .... When [the judges] traverse the
country on their circuits, they are received by the High Sheriff of each county
with the ceremonious pomp of the Middle Ages, and followed hither and thither
by admiring crowds. The criticisms of an outspoken press rarely assail their
ability, hardly ever their fairness. Even the Bar... treats them with more
respect than is commonly shown by the clergy to the bishops.
2 JAMEs BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 511 (2d ed., London, MacMillan 1891).
30. Mansfield glorified this proposition with a Latin tag-"fa]d quaestionem juris non
respondent juratores; ad quaestionemfacti non respondentjudices"-even as he enforced sharp
limitations on the jury's power in seditious libel cases. The King v. Shipley (Dean of St.
Asaph), 4 Dougl. 73, 169, 99 Eng. Rep. 774, 824 (KB. 1784).
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finding that the division in practice rarely mattered. Lawyers were
not permitted to interfere with this close and informal relationship.
After a brief revolutionary period in which American lawyers and
politicians extolled jury power and independence, the new nation
settled down to the serious business of building a fair and
predictable legal system."' Like their English counterparts,
American judges asserted control over law, but also had to maintain
some control over fact; otherwise control over law could rarely affect
the outcome of cases. To do this, American judges turned to English
precedents and developed a similar panoply of methods to control
juries.3 2 One of the main tools they used was new trial for verdict
against evidence. 3 The standard was changed in many states to
allow freer use of this form of new trial; instead of requiring that
there be no evidence on one side, courts began to say simply that
the evidence on the other side must "greatly preponderate."34
Especially in commercial cases, judges were careful to control
outcomes in this way; they recognized that predictability was
important to economic growth.35 Granting new trials, however, was
not a cheap remedy; obviously, the whole thing had to be done
again, consuming time and money. Perhaps for this reason, lawyers
tended to favor this method of jury control.3"
But American judges also developed the much less expensive,
informal methods of jury control favored by their English
counterparts. They saw their job, at least in part, as making sure
31. See Lettow, supra note 5, at 518-21.
32. See id. at 521-23.
33. See id. at 524-26. Early on, judges used juror affidavits about what happened during
deliberations to justify their decisions to grant new trials for verdict against evidence. But
as time went on and judicial confidence built, judges came to rely simply on their own
judgment of the evidence presented at trial. See id. at 526. Among other reasons, there were
fears that parties might tamper with jurors after a verdict was brought in. See id. at 534-35.
34. See id. at 544-46.
35. See id. at 546-47. The question of whether a new trial for verdict against evidence
should be granted was technically a question of law-a question of the sufficiency of proof. A
favorite method of gaining control over jury verdicts was to convert what had been
questions of fact for the jury into questions of law for the judge. See WILLIAM E. NELSON,
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ONMASSACHUSETTS
SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 169 (1975).
36. See, e.g., Trial by Jury: Remarks of Mr. Deford of Fayette, 1 PA. L.J. 99, 103
(1842)[hereinafter Trial by Jury].
37. Often those courts that were most vigorous in granting new trials were also most
supportive of informal methods of control. See Lettow, supra note 5, at 521-26.
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that the substantive result was correct the first time around. A
typical example comes from a nineteenth-century federal court
trying a railroad accident case.38 The plaintiff was a passenger
injured in the caboose when the train broke in two." The train
conductor made a written report at the time, suggesting negligence
on the part of the railroad, but at trial testified "flippantly" to a
wholly different set of facts.4" When confronted with his written
report, he said it was made "in order to hold his job."41 The judge
summed up the evidence for the jury, adding:
It is for you, gentlemen, to say what weight is to be given to the
testimony of this witness under these circumstances. For my
own part, I should consider how likely he is now to be testifying
'in order to hold his job,' and if I had to weigh his testimony
would make no account of it at all, except so far as it is
corroborated by other testimony or by circumstances.42
The jury followed the judge's suggestion and brought in a verdict
showing that they had disregarded the witness's testimony.4
After the Revolution, American judges gained the confidence to
discuss frankly with the jury what the result should be. Judges
were not forced into rigid channels of formal communication. Their
relations with juries were almost as informal and free-flowing as
that of the English judges, allowing for give and take throughout
the trial and beyond. Even after instructions were given, the jury
might come back to the judge for guidance and discuss with him
their doubts about the facts and the weight of different pieces of
evidence. The judge was then permitted to guide the jury, though
he could not positively direct them to find a certain way.'
And when the jury came in with its verdict, discussions were not
necessarily over. Judges in several American jurisdictions asked
jurors the grounds of their decision when they gave their verdict.
38. The account of the trial is given in William G. Hastings, Book Review, 10 ILL. L. Rav.
673, 677(1916).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Allen v. Kopman, 32 Ky. 222, 2 Dana 221 (1834).
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This then opened a colloquy about the soundness of those reasons.
As in England, the jury could be instructed again and sent out to
redeliberate. The practice was especially strongin Connecticut, and
seems to have spread from there to several New England states.45
There are suggestions in some cases that the judge may have had
an idea of which way the jury was leaning before it went out to
deliberate.4'6 This knowledge would undoubtedly have helpedjudges
tailor their instructions, emphasizing certain points as necessary.
All of this informal discussion, so unlike the modern black box,
helped judges ensure that the result reached was correct according
to the facts and the law.47 It also saved a great deal of time and
money, sparing judges from having to order the expensive remedy
of new trial. Not surprisingly, lawyers were on the whole less
enthusiastic about judges using these informal methods of jury
control.
B. The Treatises
American judges supported their use of informal methods ofjury
control by quoting English caselaw and treatises. The treatises were
especially influential in an era when legal professionals needed a
compact, concise statement of the law. The first treatises in
America were English ones, often in special American editions with
homegrown annotations. These clearly set forth the extensive
English power of comment on the evidence.
The old standby, which everyone with any pretensions to legal
learning had read, was of course Blackstone's Commentaries.
45. See Lettow, supra note 5, at 523.
46. See Train v. Collins, 19 Mass. 144, 152-54, 2 Pick. 145, 153-54 (1824).
47. It is interesting to compare the older, more informal approach to judge-jury
interaction with the modern hesitation of trial judges to communicate with the jury on
anything but the most rigidly formal level. This modern rigidity is especially pronounced in
cases in which appellate courts have laid down extensive pattern instructions, as in death
penalty cases. Sometimes, this rigidity works to prevent the jury from getting simple
clarification of instructions. In Weeks v. Angelone, for example, the trial court would not
answer the jury's question whether it was required to impose the death penalty if it found
an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. 120 S. Ct. 727, 730-31 (2000). The answer
was clearly "no," see id. at 732; however, the judge, no doubt fearful of being reversed on
appeal should he deviate even slightly from the approved instruction, merely directed the
jury's attention to a paragraph of the written instructions already given. See id. at 730-31.
The instructions had been previously approved in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 277
(1998). See Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 732.
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Blackstone made clear the trial judge's power to comment on
evidence.' Most forceful of all was the popular English treatise
Joseph Chitty's General Practice.49 Nineteenth-century American
lawyers carried around Chitty as they would carry their Bible. One
Missourijudge described the lawyer's legal arsenal: "By memorizing
Chitty, the Missouri statutes and decisions of the Missouri Supreme
Court, he is armed at all points."5" When Abraham Lincoln was
asked to give advice on what a young lawyer should read, he named
Chitty second only after Blackstone on a very short list.51
Chitty said that, at the conclusion of the trial, the judge states
the substance of the plaintiffs claim and of the defendant's grounds
of defense:
He then, from his notes, (sometimes reading them verbatim)
states the evidence adduced for each party, pointing out as he
proceeds to which material question or issue this or that
particular part of the evidence may apply, and commenting
occasionally on the nature of the evidence and circumstances
which attach credit to it.52
This comment could be powerful:
It is the practice for the judge at nisi prius not only to state to
the jury all the evidence that has been given, but to comment on
its bearing and weight, and to state the legal rules upon the
subject and their application to the particular case, and even to
advise them as regards the verdict they should give, so that it
may accord with his view of the law and justice; so that in effect,
in general, the jury only give their opinion on the existence of
facts, and even then, in general, they follow the advice of the
judge, and therefore in substance, the verdict is found or
anticipated by the judge's direction.53
48. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COiENTARIES ONTHE LAWS OF ENGLAND 375 (George
Tucker ed., Augustus M. Kelly Publishers 1969) (1803).
49. See JOSEPH CHiTTY, THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN ALL ITS DEPARTMENTS (Philadelphia,
P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 1836).
50. Judge William B. Napton, quoted in WILLIAM FRANCIS ENGLISH, PIONEER LAWYER
AND JURIST IN MIssOURI 98 (1947).
51. See Letter from Abraham Lincoln to James T. Thornton (Dec. 2, 1858), in 3 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM[ LINCOLN 344 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
52. 3 CHITrY, supra note 49, at 911-12.
53. 3 id. at 913-(emphasis added).
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In Chitty's view, this great influence over the jury was necessary to
curb the power of strong advocacy: "[W]ithout this assistance from
the learned judge, few juries would, in a contested cause, be able to
come to an unanimous opinion, being frequently left in a state of
great perplexity by the influence of the speeches of the contending
leaders [i.e., counsel]." 5" The lawyers could not be left to sway the
jury without the intervention of the judge.
Eventually, Americans produced treatises of their own, and these
also emphasized the English practice of commenting on evidence.
The first American treatise to be devoted entirely to new
trials-what we would now think of as grounds for appeal-was
written by David Graham and published in New York in 1834.15 For
several pages, Graham tackled the question "[wihether, and how
far, the judges may transcend the limits assigned them, on
questions of law, and express their opinions on the truth or weight
of the testimony in their charge to the jury."56 He concluded, "[i]t
would appear from the practice in England, and in this country, in
most, if not all of the states, a large discretion is allowed, and
unless abused to the subversion ofjustice, the courts are disinclined
to interfere."57
54. 3 id.
55. See DAVID GRAHAM, AN ESSAYONNEWTRIALS (New York, Halsted & Voorhies 1834).
Graham (1808-1852) was a well-educated, well-respected legal writer, practitioner, and
sometime Whig politician. The son of a cultured Presbyterian minister from northern Ireland
who became a lawyer after arriving in New York City, Graham was educated by his father
and entered into practice with him in 1829. In 1832, when he was only 24, he published A
Treatise on the Practice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, which was "received
with enthusiasm by the profession" and replaced existing books on practice until the code of
procedure was promulgated in 1850. 7 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 472 (Allen
Johnson & Dumas Malone eds., 1931). In 1834, the same year he publishedAn Essay on New
Trials, he was elected, at the age of 26, an alderman of New York City as a Whig. He
published A Treatise on the Organization and Jurisdiction of the Courts of Law and Equity
in the State of New York in 1839. In addition to his legalwriting, he had considerable success
as a courtroom advocate, most notably appearing as defense counsel in the capital murder
case of The People v. White. In 1848, the New York legislature appointed him to be one of the
commissioners on practice and pleadings. This commission was dominated by David Dudley
Field and produced what came to be known as the Field Code, although there is some
suggestion Graham played an active role in drafting the code of civil procedure. See 7
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra, at 471-72.
56. GRAHAM, supra note 55, at 310.
57. Id.
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Graham's treatise was revised and reissued by Thomas Water-
man in 1855, so thoroughly that it should be considered a separate
treatise.58 Waterman's summary of practice in 1855 is the same as
Graham's in 1834:
The expression, by the judge, of an opinion upon the evidence,
therefore, however strong or decided, has been held not to be
objectionable, where it is given merely as his opinion, and the
jury, notwithstanding it, are at full liberty to entertain their
own views, and to decide accordingly: it being deemed to be in
the nature of a simple avowal, and not an authoritative
direction."
Waterman, however, disapproved of this rule as undemocratic, and
lamented that "it is too strongly established to be suddenly
overthrown."" In the time between Graham and Waterman, the
practice had become more controversial in some quarters.
C. The Necessity of Comment: Reasons for the Power
Graham and Waterman accurately described most states'
approach; most early-nineteenth-century judges firmly believed in
the necessity of judges commenting on evidence, for two reasons.
First, they said, jurors were often less educated and more inex-
perienced in sifting through evidence than judges. Second, and more
importantly, a particularly skilled lawyer could unjustly influence
the jury to give a verdict in favor of his client.
On the first point, appellate courts noted that judges by and large
possessed the valuable qualities of impartiality and intelligence and
58. See THOMAS W. WATERMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND EQUITY
WHICH GOVERN COURTS INTHE GRANTING OFNEWTRIALS IN CASES CIVILAND CRIMIINAL (New
York, Banks, Gould & Co. 1855). Waterman (1821-1898) was, on paper at least, better edu-
cated than Graham. The son of a Yale-educated district attorney and businessman in
Binghamton, New York, he entered Yale college himself in 1838. After three years at Yale,
he traveled throughout England and the Continent for several years. He began practice in
New York City in 1848, and wrote extensively and edited legal works throughout his career.
His best-known work was the three-volume American Chancery Digest, published in 1851,
which included state and federal equity decisions and an introduction describing equity
courts and their jurisdiction. See 19 DICTIONARY OF AmERICAN BIOGRAPHY 535-36 (Dumas
Malone ed., 1936).
59. 3 WATERIAN, supra note 58, at 726.
60. 3 id. at 730.
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were, in addition, more experienced in sorting through evidence
than the average juror. Well-respected Judge Ruffin of the North
Carolina Supreme Court said that "elucidations from an upright,
learned, and discreet" judge, who was "habituated to the
investigation of complicated masses of testimony, often
contradictory, and often apparently so, but really reconcilable,
would be of infinite utility to a conscientious jury in arriving at just
conclusions."6 ' Impartial judges could help to control jurors subject
to the sway of popular opinion or passion against an unpopular
group or cause. Federalists such as Joseph Story were especially
concerned about anti-insurance company bias among jurors.6 2
On the second point, American judges' prime concern echoed
Chitty: Without judicial comment, jurors would succumb to the
influence of partisan lawyers. Lawyers would be able to take
advantage of the jury's most salient weaknesses by introducing
unjustified confusion about the evidence or by playing upon jurors'
preexisting biases. Judicial comment was viewed as a much-needed
antidote to counteract lawyerly excesses. Judge Ruffin of North
Carolina believed that "after the able and ingenious, but interested
and partial arguments ofcounsel,"justice would be better served by
the judge following with "his own calm, discreet, sensible and
impartial summary of the case, including both law and fact."63 The
judge should be empowered to "aid[ I the jury by rescuing the case
from the false glosses of powerful advocates.""
61. State v. Moses, 13 N.C. 292, 296, 2 Dev. 452, 458 (1830). Ruffin hailed from the
Virginia Tidewater elite and was a well-educated man, having studied, like his fellow
Virginian James Madison, at the College of New Jersey (later Princeton). As a young man
he was strongly attracted to Jefferson's party. But over the course of his career he became
a staunch defender of the independence of the judiciary against both the legislature and the
people. See HUEBNER, supra note 14, at 131-35. In Hoke v. Henderson, he struck down as
unconstitutional a statute providing for popular election of court clerks, on the grounds that
the office taken was property. 15 N.C. 1, 12-15, 4 Dev. 1, 15-19 (1833). In the opinion he
issued a stern warning about judicial independence being necessary for impartiality on the
bench. See id. at 18, 4 Dev. at 23; see also Walter F. Pratt, Jr., The Struggle for Judicial
Independence inAntebellum North Carolina: The Story of Two Judges, 4 LAwANDHIST. REV.
129, 148-58 (1986) (discussing Ruffin's decision in Hoke).
62. See Lettow, supra note 5, at 546-47. Story wrote in the context of a marine insurance
case that "in mercantile causes, [merchants] are not fond ofjuries." 1 LIFE AND LETERS OF
JOSEPH STORY 270 (William W. Story ed., Boston, C.C. Little and J. Brown 1851).
63. Moses, 13 N.C. at 296, 2 Dev. at 458.
64. Id. at 299, 2 Dev. at 462.
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Ruffin knew whereof he spoke; he had been a powerful advocate
himself, with a manner that was "rough and often offensive,"65 and
he could become so excited during an examination or argument that
he "would sometimes knock the floor instead of the table with his
knuckles."66 Ruffin criticized the North Carolina statute forbidding
judges to give their opinion on a case67 and maintained that "[i]f
this duty [of comment] were imposed on the judge, it is not to be
questioned, that success would oftener than it does depend on the
justice of the case, rather than the ability or adroitness of the
advocate." 8
D. Appellate Encouragement of Commenting on Evidence
Most appellate courts, animated by these arguments in favor of
judicial comment, gave trial judges great leeway in this area. In
case after case in the first half of the nineteenth century, appellate
judges affirmed the power of trial judges to give their opinion on the
evidence. For the most part, American appellate courts emphasized
that the relationship between judge and jury was a collaboration,
not a combat or competition. Again and again, opinions speak of
judges "aiding" the jury, and vice versa. They were partners
working together to reach a verdict.
The opinions borrowed the rhetoric of English courts, together
with their doctrine. Many of the judges who asserted this power
most forcefully were in states that used the English nisi prius
system, whereby appellate judges also acted as trial judges. These
judges thus did not feel the strong division between the trial and
appellate bench that exists today.69 The ability to comment was
65. 2 THE PAPERS OF ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY 427 (William Henry Hoyt ed., 1914).
66. Fannie Memory Farmer, Legal Practice and Ethics in North Carolina, 1820-1860,30
N.C. HIST. REv. 329, 339 (1953).
67. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
68. Moses, 13 N.C. at 296, 2 Dev. at 458.
69. Hurst noted the "unfortunate significance" of terms such as "inferior courts" and
judges and "the court below," which creptinto the legal vocabulary once the states abandoned
the English nisiprius system and put in place appellate courts with separate personnel. See
HURST, supra note 17, at 98-99. In Hurst's view, these terms "implied that such courts were
less important and could get along with something less than first-rate judges or standards
of operation." Id. at 98. The shift doubtless encouraged appellate courts to limit trial judges'
informal powers, such as commenting on the evidence.
213
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
generally the same in both civil and criminal cases, and often had
considerable influence on the jury.
Judges often asserted their power vigorously."0 In Massachusetts,
a state that used the English nisi prius system, Chief Justice
Parker was impatient of an argument that a trial judge had
improperly commented on evidence in a criminal libel case: "We
know of no rule requiring the judge to conceal his opinion. He is to
comment upon the evidence."" He asked rhetorically: "Is he to do
it by merely stating that one witness says this thing and another
says that? Has he not power to say, this evidence is weak and that
evidence is strong?"72 Chief Justice Parker said that, for his part,
where the evidence on both sides was nearly balanced, "I endeavour
to leave it to the jury to decide which scale preponderates; but if the
evidence on one side is strong, compared with that on the other
side, I think it my duty to make the jury comprehend that it is so." 3
Parker aggressively rejected challenges to the judges' discretion:
"The next step will be, to move for a new trial on account of the
expression of countenance of the judge .... Confidence must be
reposed in the [judiciary] ."
In several key jurisdictions, the only remedy for inappropriate
judicial comment was a new trial for verdict against evidence. 5 In
70. See, e.g., Governor v. Shelby, 2 Blackf. 26 (Ind. 1826); Jarman v. Howard, 10 Ky.
1209, 3 A.K. Marsh. 383 (1821); Burt v. Gwinn, 8 Md. 404, 4 H. & J. 507 (1819); Sneed v.
Creath, 8 N.C. 157, 1 Hawks 309 (1821); Stouffer v. Latshaw, 2 Watts 165 (Pa. 1834); Malson
v. Fry, 1 Watts 433 (Pa. 1833); Conner v. State, 10 Tenn. 111, 4 Yer. 136 (1833); Roper v.
Stone, 3 Tenn. (1 Cooke) 497 (1814); Gordon v. Tabor, 5 Vt. 31 (1833).
71. Commonwealthv. Child, 27 Mass. 252,256,10 Pick. 252,256 (1830). Commonwealth
v. Child was a criminal libel case laden with political overtones. David Child allegedly
libeled John Keyes, a member of the Senate of the General Court of Massachusetts and
chairman of the Committee of Accounts, by accusing Keyes in the Massachusetts Journal of
having rigged a bidding contest for a government printing job in favor of the Jacksonian
newspaper the Boston Statesman. See Presentment of the Grand Jury, Commonwealth v.
Child, in Supreme Judicial Court Records 1830-1834, at 259-60 (Oct. 1832) (available at the
Massachusetts State Archives). Note that Chief Justice Parker, a federalist, was approving
ofajudge who summed up a case against a (presumably federalist) opponent ofa Jacksonian.
On Chief Justice Parker's politics and judicial career, see Russell K. Osgood, Isaac Parker:
Republican Judge, Federalist Values, in THE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MASSAcHUSETTS: THE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 1692-1992, at 153 (Russell K. Osgood ed., 1992).
72. Id. at 256, 10 Pick. at 256.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Sims v. Reed, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 51, 54-55 (1851); Child, 27 Mass. at 256,
10 Pick. at 257; Flanders v. Colby, 28 N.H. 34,39 (1853); Woodbeckv. Keller, 6 Cow. 118, 123
[Vol. 42:195214
2000] TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL TRIAL 215
other words, appellate courts would step in only if the jury's verdict
was clearly wrong. 6 Courts in other states did not explicitly adopt
that standard, but still allowed trial judges considerable discretion.
In almost every state, judges could even direct a jury to find a
particular verdict as long as, if the jury found the opposite way, a
new trial for verdict against evidence would be granted.77 An
expensive additional trial could therefore be prevented. The jury
itself, according to some judges, would help to police problematic
comment. "Though an undue influence may be exerted upon the
jury by the manner of a judge, yet the law presumes intelligence in
the jury;" and if they see any improper attempt to influence them,
said Parker in Commonwealth v. Child, they would more likely find
"against the opinion of the judge" than with him. 8
In view of the benefits of judges commenting on evidence, some
appellate courts were concerned that trial judges might comment
too little. They devised ways to force judges to comment, mainly by
turning what would appear to be questions of fact into questions of
law. 9 In Dunlop v. Patterson, an 1825 case of trover for a boat, the
Supreme Court of New York actually granted a new trial because
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) (citing Beers v. Root, 9 Johns. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812), and Feeter v.
Whipple, 8 Johns. 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811)).
76. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text for a discussion ofthe standard for new
trial for verdict against evidence. Note that using this standard to determine if judicial
comment went too far relieved the appellate court of the duty to speculate about the
subjective effectthe comment might have had on thejury. The reviewingcourtsimplylooked
at whether thejury's verdict was in line with the evidence at trial, an objective standard. The
debate over whether judges reviewingmistakes injury instructions should focus more on the
correctness of the verdict or on possible effects on the jury crops up today in discussions of
harmless error. Compare Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999) (stating that the
proper inquiry is whether the "error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained"), with id. at 17 (finding that the verdict was "supported by overwhelming
evidence").
77. See Dean v. Hewit, 5 Wend. 257, 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830). See, e.g., Henderson v.
Mabry, 13 Ala. 713 (1848); Coit v. Tracy, 9 Conn. 1 (1831); Tefft v. Ashbaugh, 13 Ill. 602
(1852); Crookshank v. Kellogg, 8 Blackf. 256 (Ind. 1846); Sawyer v. Nichols, 40 Me. 212
(1855); Davis v. Barney, 2 G. & J. 382 (Md. 1830); O'Kelly v. O'Kelly, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 436
(1844); Perryv. Clarke, 4 Miss. 199,5 Howard 495 (1841); Speed v. Herrin, 4 Mo. 356 (1836);
Wells v. Clements, 48 N.C. 174, 3 Jones 168 (1855); Roddy v. Kingsbury, 5 Tex. 151 (1849).
78. Child, 27 Mass. at 256, 10 Pick. at 257.
79. There were other mechanisms as well. Ajudge could also be required to comment on
evidence, through the mechanism of granting a new trial, ifa party had requested comment
and the jury had erred because of lack of instruction. See GRAHAAM, supra note 55, at 277-78.
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a judge failed to comment adequately on a witness's credibility.0 A
crucial witness for the plaintiff, one Fuller, testified under cross-
examination that he had perjured himself on the exact point in
issue in a previous case between the same two parties.8 ' The trial
judge charged the jury that "Fuller was a competent witness, whose
testimony should go to the jury, who might give that weight to it
which they thought it deserved."82 The jury found for the plaintiff.
Judge Woodworth of the Supreme Court called the charge
"manifestly erroneous."" He admitted that the jury "are judges of
fact, and the credibility of witnesses," but said that the jury "have
no arbitrary discretion. It is their duty to follow the advice of the
court as to the law."' Woodworth reasoned, "[tihe law will not
permit either life or property to be put in jeopardy by such
testimony. If it would, there must be but little security for either."85
The trial judge should have instructed the jury that Fuller's
testimony "was not entitled to credit, and ought not to be
regarded." 6 The New York court believed that predictability and
accurate fact finding in commercial cases required judges to guide
the jury.
E. Judicial Limitations on the Power to Comment: Fear of
Partisanship
But appellate judges were also concerned about trial judges
overstepping their bounds. A few appellate judges appeared to
agree with Waterman that jurors were well-equipped to find facts
based on their common sense. Others relied on variations of an
80. 5 Cow. 243, 246-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825).
81. See id. at 244.
82. Id. at 244.
83. Id. at 246.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 247.
86. Id. at 248. Graham and Waterman both made a point of citing Dunlop, and did not
confine its rule to New York. See GRAHAM, supra note 55, at 276-77; WATERMAN, supra note
58, at 809-10. Graham also cited for this propositionNewell v. Wright, 8 Conn. 319 (1831) and
Allen v. Young, 22 Ky. (6 T.B. Mon.) 136 (1827). See GRAHAM, supra note 55, at 277 n.1.
Waterman cited Bakeman v. Rose, 14 Wen. 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835). See WATERMAN, supra
note 58, at 819 n.1.
87. See, e.g., Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324,345 (1849) ("T]he general diffusion of knowledge
and education among the people of this country, much better fits them for weighing and
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argument that trial judges had political or personal biases that
needed to be counteracted.
In the widely quoted 1815 case New York Firemen Insurance Co.
v. Walden, no less a supporter ofjudicial authority than Chancellor
Kent of New York explained why the "salutary" power of comment
on evidence should have some limits.88 Kent hastened to say he
encouraged judges to offer their opinions on fact to the jury, and to
grant new trials to correct juries if the need arose.
I am far from wishing to restrain the judges of the Courts of law
from expressing freely their opinions to the jury on matters of
fact, and still less from interfering with their power of
controlling the mistaken verdicts of juries, by a liberal exercise
of the discretion of awarding new trials. 9
He declared that "[n]o man can be more deeply sensible of the value
and salutary tendency of this judicial aid and discretion." °
All Kent asked was that, when a judge commented on fact, "it
shall be delivered as mere opinion, and not as direction, and that
the jury shall be left to understand, clearly, that they are to decide
the fact, upon their own view of the evidence."91 According to Kent,
"the judge interposes his opinion only to aid them in cases of
difficulty, or to inspire them with confidence in cases of doubt.""
He was anxious to reinforce the formal divide between questions
of fact and questions of law, between the province of the jury and
that of the court. "I am disposed to hand to posterity the institution
of juries as perfect, in all respects, as we now enjoy it;" he wrote,
"for I believe it may, in times hereafter, be found to be no
comparing the evidence, than in any other nation or age since the institution of trial by
Jury."); cf Trial by Jury, supra note 36, at 102-03 ("The common mind... unsophisticated
by false logic and technical nicety, is more likely to receive a just impression from the facts
and arrive at the simple truth than the Court. This the experience of ages and wisdom have
proved.").
88. 12 Johns. 513,519,520 n.2 (N.Y. 1815) (citing Fisher's Ex'r v. Duncan, 11Va. (1 Hen.
& M.) 563 (1807)). Waterman made much of Kent's opinion in Walden, holding it out as a
model of the judge-jury relation. See WATERMAN, supra note 58, at 750-51.
89. Walden, 12 Johns. at 519.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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inconsiderable security against the systematic influence and
tyranny of party spirit, in inferior tribunals."93
While Kent disclaimed any particular problem in this case,
presumably hoping to cool party sentiment, this was nevertheless
a case in which a trial judge had essentially directed a verdict for
a plaintiff against an insurance company in a relatively close case.94
The strong inference was that party affiliations had affected him.
Insurance cases were likely to provoke partisan squabbles, since
Jeffersonians, and later Jacksonians, were generally suspicious of
such financial institutions while Federalists, and later Whigs,
viewed them as necessary elements of economic development that
needed protection from dangerous populists.95 The Federalist Kent's
warning about partisanship on the lower bench came at a time of
rising party feeling.96 This tension is reflected in the New York
Court of Errors, in which the Walden appeal was heard. The Court
of Errors was a highly political body composed of the chancellor, the
judges of the supreme court, and the senators of the state
legislature.97 The vote in Walden was a close one, eleven to eight in
favor of Kent's position. Not surprisingly, Van Buren, a Jeffersonian
state senator at the time, voted against Kent.9"
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. See id. at 514-15, 519.
95. See RIcHARDE. ELLIs, THE JEFFERSONiAN CRISIS: COURTS AND PoLrITcS IN THE YoUNG
REPUBLIC 280 (1971).
96. Early-nineteenth-century New York politics were partly controlled by a complex
Jeffersonian machine guided by, in turn, Aaron Burr, DeWitt Clinton, and, most successfully,
the dapper Martin Van Buren. See generally JEROME MUSHKAT AND JOSEPH G. RAYBACK,
MARTIN VAN BUREN: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE SHAPING OF REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY (1997)
(discussing the political career of Van Buren and his contemporaries). This machine was
devoted to filling every possible government office, including judgeships, with Jeffersonians
of the proper stripe and to limiting the influence of hated Federalists such as Kent.
Jefferson's grand inaugural phrase, "We are all Republicans: we are all Federalists," rang
hollow in actual practice, as his supporters, with his knowledge and at least tacit approval,
discharged Federalists and filled government offices with Republicans. ELLIS, supra note 95,
at 30-35. Sometimes this was done with a thoroughness that caused consternation even
among those sympathetic to him politically. See Letter from Margaret Bayard Smith to
Samuel H. Smith (May 17, 1803), in THE FIRST FORTY YEARS OF WASHINGTON SOcIETY 37
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). In part, this was a reaction to Federalist office-packing, especially
John Adams' famous "midnight"judicial appointments that sparked the controversy between
Messrs. Marbury and Madison. See ELLIS, supra note 95, at 32.
97. This was the court of last resort in New York until it was abolished in 1847. See
Lettow, supra note 5, at 520 n.92.
98. See Walden, 12 Johns. at 520 n.1. Kent, Bishop, Bloom, Cochrane, Crosby, Keys, P.W.
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If Kent was concerned about the influence of Jeffersonian judges,
Jeffersonian concerns about Federalist judges were greater.
Jefferson himself was constantly irritated by the Federalist John
Marshall's exercise of judicial review in favor of commercial
interests, and was thoroughly provoked when Marshall subpoenaed
him in Aaron Burr's treason trial. 9 The midnight appointments of
1800, the enactment and repeal of the Federalists' Judiciary Act,
and the fracas surrounding the impeachment of Justice Chase all
fueled Jeffersonian concerns about the judiciary.' 0
But there was also a question of broader principle: Jeffersonians,
and their political heirs, the Jacksonian Democrats, were on
principle more wary of judicial power, following their populist
ideology. Adherents of these parties agreed with Tocqueville that
the judiciary was an aristocratic element in society, but took exactly
the opposite view of its benignity: They believed judges needed to
be subjected to the people's will.10 '
Waterman himself perfectly expressed the Democratic view. The
pernicious power of comment, he said,
had its rise in England, where the judges are high dignitaries,
claiming all the power and influence which the monarchical
system under which they live gives to them; and where juries
coming from the middle class are looked down upon as inferior
in intelligence, as well as in position."2
Radcliff, Stewart, Swift, Tabor, and Van Schoonhoven voted to reverse; Arnold, Atwater,
Hager, Prendergast, Rouse, Tibbits, Van Buren, and Van Bryck voted to affrm. See id.
99. Jefferson told Madison that, "[t]he judiciary of the United States... is the subtle
corps ofsappers and miners constantly working under ground to undermine the foundations
of our confederated fabric." 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
THOMAS JEFFERSONAND JAMuES MADISON, 1776-1826, at 33 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995);
see also GRANT GILtiORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 23-29 (1977) (discussing the impact
of industrialization on Jefferson's agricultural ideal of society). He rejoiced in attacks on
Marshall, in particular. See Laurance M. Hyde, Judges: Their Selection and Tenure, 22
N.Y.U. L. REV. 389, 391 (1947) (citing Jefferson's differences with Marshall as one of the
reasons for his support of an elected judiciary).
100. See Jerry W. Knudson, The Jeffersonian Assault on the Federalist Judiciary, 1802-
1805; Political Forces and Press Reaction, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 55, 60-63 (1970).
101. For example, one Jacksonian writer proclaimed that life tenure for judges was an
"odious and aristocratical" practice that must be abolished. JOSEPH HOPKINSON, SPEECHES
OF JOSEPH HOPHINSON AND CHARLES CHAUNCEY, ON THE JUDICIAL TENURE 21-22
(Philadelphia, E.L. Carey & A. Hart 1838).
102. WATERMAN, supra note 58, at 730.
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Alas, "[wie have copied it from the English practice, without regard
to our democratic notions, which ought to invest our juries with
more character."'0 ° In the South and West, as we shall see, this
populist strand of thinking combined with an antiauthoritarian,
emotional legal culture-a combination that fostered measures
limiting judges' ability to comment on evidence.
II. POLITICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND TO MEASURES
RESTRICTING JUDGES' POWER
While the power of judges to comment on the evidence was
vigorous in many states before the Civil War, in the South and West
it was being limited. This was done at different times and by
different means-by constitutional amendment, statute, and even
judicial decision. In this section we will consider common factors
among the states that adopted restrictions on judicial comment in
order to understand better the social and legal conditions that gave
rise to those restrictions. This knowledge will shed light on the
discussion of individual states' moves to restrict comment in Part
III.
We will first address the thesis that popular election of
judges-part of the general movement to subject government officials
to greater popular control-caused the restrictions on comment. We
will then turn to the question of regional differences, and the very
different legal culture of the South and West compared to that of
the North. In particular, the lawyer's approach to advocacy and the
courtroom atmosphere was notably different in the South and West.
Despite their potency, these differences have not been well
examined in terms of their impact on procedure.
A. Electing Judges
It has been suggested that there may be a link between the
practice of electing judges, which was spreading at breakneck speed
in the middle of the nineteenth century, and limiting judges' ability
103. Id.
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to comment on evidence. 4 This link could take two forms. First,
experience with elected judges might have caused citizens and
appellate judges to mistrust the competence and impartiality of
trial judges, and so led to limitations on comment. Second, electing
judges and limiting judicial comment might simply have been part
of the same broad-based popular movement to limit judges' power.
The first theory was held by late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-
century leaders of the bar and bench. They attributed the curtailing
of judges' power in the courtroom to the deplorable effects of
electing judges. The idea was that elections yielded poor judges,
which in turn triggered the desire to prevent them from
commenting.105 Charles Eliot, Harvard's innovative president, said
judicial elections were largely responsible for keeping the judge
from his rightful place as "the principal person in the court room."
1 6
This may have been true later in the century, when restrictions on
the ability to comment spread throughout the country. But it simply
was not true before the Civil War. Every single state that had both
types of provisions in the antebellum era restricted the judge's
ability to comment before or at the same time as it adopted judicial
elections. 7 Before the Civil War, bad experiences with elected
judges did not cause restrictions on comment.
104. See, e.g., Krasity, supra note 17, at 611-12.
105. See George E. Brand, Selection of Judges-The Fiction of Majority Election, 34 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SocY 136, 142-43 (1951); Stewart H. Perry, Politics and Judicial
Administration, 17 J. AM. JUDICATURE SoC'Y 133, 134 (1934).
106. Charles W. Eliot, The Instant Duty of the Legal Profession to the Community, in
THIRD ANNUALREPORT OFTHE MASSACHUSETTS BARASSOCIATION 36,40 (1913). There were
also suggestions that elected judges grew timid in their own courtrooms for fear of offending
influential lawyers, and therefore were happy to refrain from comment on evidence. See
Frederick Bausman, Election of Federal Judges, 37 AM. L. REv. 886, 887 (1903). Eliot
believed "[uinwise legislation" was responsible for judges losing control of their courtrooms
to lawyers, and claimed that "[1]awyers dissatisfied with the control exercised over
themselves by individual judges have originated some of this pernicious legislation." Eliot,
supra, at 40.
107. Compare infra notes 206-338 "nd accompanying text, and Krasity, supra note 17, at
app. A (listing the dates on which states prohibited judicial comment), with Kermit L. Hall,
The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary,
1846-1860,45 HIsTORIAN 337,337 & n.2 (1983) (listing the dates on which states adopted the
elective method). It could be noted that Alabama modified its judicial comment statute in
1852, two years after it began electing judges. See ALA. CODE § 2274 (1852); Hall, supra, at
337 n.2 (noting that Alabama amended its constitution to require election ofjudges in 1850).
But Alabama had banned comment in 1802 when it was part of the Mississippi Territory. See
infra note 242 and accompanying text.
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As for the second theory, it too seems to be incorrect. As Table 1
illustrates, there was in general little correlation before the Civil
War between states that restricted the judges' ability to comment
and those that adopted judicial election.
Table 1:
Electing Judges
the Civil War
and Restricting Judicial Comment Before
States that States that did
elected judges0 8  not elect judges
States that Alabama, Florida,
restricted Arkansas, Massachusetts,
comment on California, Georgia, North Carolina
evidence 9  Illinois, Iowa,
Louisiana,
Maryland,
Mississippi, Ohio,
Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia
States that did Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
not restrict Indiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire,
comment on Michigan, New Jersey, Rhode
evidence Minnesota, Island,
New York, Oregon, South Carolina
Pennsylvania,
Vermont,
Wisconsin
After 1846, when Iowa entered the Union with a constitution
providing for elected judges and New York amended its constitution
to provide the same, every new state elected judges and most of the
108. See Hall, supra note 107, at 337 n.2.
109. For details of how and when these states restrictedjudicial comment on evidence, see
infra notes 206-338 and accompanying text; Krasity, supra note 17, at app. A.
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existing states switched over.11 The judicial elections movement
seemed to know no geographic boundaries, except for resistance in
a few New England states.' In contrast, the movement to limit
judicial comment before the Civil War was much more strictly
confined to the South and West. In those regions we do see a
correlation between electing judges and limiting judicial comment,
with the two developments often occurring close together in time."2
The debate over electing judges roughly followed party lines;
Democrats were in favor and Whigs opposed."' The dominant
Democrats were generally suspicious of government authority-in
whatever branch, executive, legislative, or judicial-and were doing
their best to limit that authority. The idea was to subject officials
to the control of the electorate in the most direct possible way, to
ensure the people's will would be done and not thwarted. Caleb
Nelson points out that the same conventions that removed the
110. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 190.
111. The only exceptions to the rule that a constitutional convention called at this time
produced an electedjudiciarywere Massachusetts and New Hampshire. See Hall, supra note
107, at 337-38. In Massachusetts, the constitutional convention decided against proposing
an elective judiciary, but its proposed constitution was voted down anyway. See Nelson,
supra note 20, at 202.
112. Brand new California put both provisions in its constitution of 1849. See CAL. CONST.
of 1849, art. VI, §§ 5, 17. Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, and Texas enacted legislation restricting
judges' power to comment in the late 1830s and mid '40s, see infra notes 246-49 and
accompanying text, and adopted judicial election soon thereafter in the late'40s or early'50s.
See Hall, supra note 107, at 337 n.2. Georgia enacted legislation limiting judges' power to
comment in 1850, see infra note 298 and accompanying text, and decided to elect judges in
1852. See Hall, supra note 107, at 337 n.2. Alabama modified its statute restricting judge's
power to comment in 1852, see ALA. CODE § 2274 (1852), and decided to elect judges in 1850.
See Hall, supra note 107, at 337 n.2.
113. See, e.g., Constitutional Reform, 13 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 565, 569 (1843);
The Convention-Reorganization of the Judiciary, 2 Am. REV.: WHIGJ. POL. LITERATURE ART
& Sd. 474, 477-78 (1845); Elective Judiciary, 22 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 199 (1848);
History of Constitutional Reform in the United States, 18 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATICREV. 403,
417 (1846); The New Constitution: Article VI-The Judiciary, 4 AM. REV.: WHIG J. POL.
LITERATUREART&ScI. 520,525-28 (1846);Responsibility oftheBallotBox, 4 AM. REV.: WHIG
J. POL. LITERATURE ART & Sci. 435, 435-36, 439-41 (1846). Kermit Hall suggests that such
partisan alignments were somewhat superficial and highlights the importance of a group of
"moderates" on whose votes the outcomes of the state conventions largely depended. In his
view, these moderates favored judicial election as a means of increasing the power of the
judiciary by providing them with an independent political base. See Hall, supra note 107, at
341-43. Caleb Nelson convincingly argues that the more important factor in the success of
judicial election was the desire-mostly associated with Jacksonian Democrats-to limit
judicial power, and indeed the power of government officials generally. See Nelson, supra
note 20, at 224.
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power of governors and legislatures to appoint judges removed their
power to appoint many other officials." 4 The principle of election
reigned. As one disenchanted representative at the Kentucky
convention put it, "We have provided for the popular election of
every public officer save the dog catcher, and if the dogs could vote,
we should have that as well."" 5
Territorial residents writing new state constitutions were so
confident of the superiority of judicial election that they hardly
considered the question, having had bitter experience with federal
judicial appointees. As one Kansas editor put it in 1859, territorial
residents had "suffered beyond imagination from the judicial
despots who have lorded it over us. Of course, the... judiciary will
be elected."" 6
Those who favored judicial election sometimes referred to trial
judges' charges as ajudicial usurpation of the jury's right. The jury,
after all, was the direct voice of the people and needed to be freed
from interference by the judge-just another government official-on
the facts. One delegate to the Kentucky convention declared, in the
midst of a debate about whether to elect the judiciary, "A jury
decides the facts of the case, and your judges the law of the case.
Questions of fact are much more difficult to be decided than
questions of law."" 7 Electing judges, the theory ran, would subject
them to the will of the people and thus help to prevent judicial
intrusion on facts-an important province of the people alone."'
Such was the theory; and it was lawyers who were espousing it
and making sure provisions for electing judges were included in the
114. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 207.
115. Hall, supra note 107, at 340-41 (quoting 1 THE OLD GUARD 22 (Thomas F. Marshall
& J.H. Holeman eds., Frankfort 1850)).
116. Hall, supra note 107, at 339 (quoting LAWRENCE REPUBLICAN, July 6, 1859); see also
KERMIT L. HALL, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION AND THE
SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829-61, at 12-13, 100-10, 134-41 (1979) (describing the territorial
judiciary).
117. REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION
OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY, 1849-1850, at 175 (Frankfort 1850)
(remarks of George Kavanaugh).
118. See, e.g., SAMUEL MEDARY, THE NEW CONSTITUTION 153 (Columbus 1849); 1 REPORT
OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONOFTHE STATE OF OHIO, 1850-51, at 585 (Columbus 1851); Hall, supra note 107,
at 348 (citing IS IT EXPEDIENT THAT A STATE CONVENTION SHOULD BE CALLED TO REMODEL
THE CONSTITUTION? 7-8 (Boston 1852)).
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new state constitutions. Hall notes "the overwhelming role of
lawyer-delegates in the conventions"; lawyers "controlled the
committees on the judiciary" and "also dominated debate over the
issue once it reached the full conventions."" 9 In the South and
West, lawyers were able to build on popular enthusiasm for limiting
officials' power to achieve not only election of judges, but explicit
constitutional and statutory limitations on comment as well. In
this, they were aided by the peculiar southern and western legal
culture.
B. The Significance of the South and West
The real divide was thus not between the states that elected
judges and those that did not, but rather between the Northeast,
Mid-Atlantic, and Northwest on the one hand, and the South and
West on the other. What was it about the southern and western
states that led them to restrict judges' ability to comment? They
certainly had a strong populist strain, and tended to be democratic
in politics. But several states in the North, such as Maine and
Wisconsin, fit that description without adopting such restrictions.'20
One distinction worth exploring is that the southern and western
states by and large had a very different legal culture from those of
the North. It was more violent, aggressive, emotional, and far less
respectful of authority and decorum. This suited many of the new
style of lawyer very well-they flourished in such an environment,
with their greater control over trial.'2 ' This was not the sort of
119. Hall, supra note 107, at 342.
120. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 198.
121. Many legal commentators in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were
much more blunt than their early-nineteenth-century counterparts in noting lawyers' fierce
interest in prohibiting judges from commenting on the evidence. For example, the president
of the University of North Carolina noted in 1888 that "this practice inevitably provokes the
wrath of lawyers." Kemp P. Battle, An Address on the History of the Supreme Court (ofNorth
Carolina), in 103 N.C. 441, 469 (1889). Another legal writer criticized the persistence of
restrictions on comment and said, "[the secret trouble is the presence of that unworthy spirit
of chicane on the practitioner's part that dreads such an interference with his manipulation
of the jury, as the taking away of this trammel upon the judge's action would cause."
Hastings, supra note 38, at 678. Modem law and economics theory has provided a theoretical
underpinning for the idea that lawyers' earnings increase if the outcomes of cases are more
unpredictable and dependent upon their own skill. See, e.g., John P. Gould, The Economics
of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis
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atmosphere in which a judge's taking the jury "by the hand to guide
them, "12 in Tocqueville's phrase, would be tolerated-either by the
population at large, or especially by the lawyers.
1. The Exceptions: Kentucky and South Carolina
The cases of the two southern states that did not prohibit judicial
comment, Kentucky and South Carolina, are instructive. Kentucky
was rare, if not unique, among southern states in being a Whig
stronghold. Dominated by Henry Clay and his political allies, the
Whig party in Kentucky held sway for years over the governorship
and both houses of the legislature. 2 1 While Kentuckians might
suffer an occasional bout of populism and begin electing judges,
they were not likely to copy every attempt to limit government
officials' power. In the case of Kentucky, the prevailing political
views overcame its likeness in other respects to its southern and
western neighbors. In addition, the early-nineteenth-century bar of
Kentucky was unusual in having a significant number of lawyers
trained formally in a law school, especially at the law departments
at Transylvania University and the University of Louisville." This
formal training encouraged conservative tendencies in Kentucky
lawyers.
South Carolina was also sui generis: It had had a romance with
aristocracy since its founding by Barbadian planters in the mid-
seventeenth century. Members of the early South Carolina elite had
even tried to call themselves "landgraves" and "cassiques."125 The
South Carolina bar in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries was the closest to the English model of any colony or
state. It was tiny, highly educated, and, at the top end, fabulously
well compensated. In the colonial period, the highest court exercised
centralized control over admissions to the bar, and by the
of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61(1971); Richard A. PosnerAn Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
122. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 7, at 275.
123. See JAMESW. GORDON, LAWYERS INPOLITICS: MID-NINETEENTH CENTURYKENTUCKY
AS A CASE STUDY 102-04 (1990); MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN
WHIG PARTY: JACKSONIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 116, 926 (1999).
124. See GORDON, supra note 123, at 94-95.
125. See M. EUGENE SIRMANS, COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA: A POLITICAL HISTORY, 1663-
1763, at 10-11 (1966).
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Revolution had deemed only fifty-eight people worthy to practice.
Of these fifty-eight, no fewer than forty-seven had been educated in
the English Inns of Court.
126
The Middle Temple was a favorite destination for South
Carolinians, and there they developed connections with prominent
English Whigs. 127 Many members of the South Carolina bar had
also been to Eton, Westminster, Wakefield, Oxford, and Cam-
bridge.128 These were the scions of the dominant planter
families-Rutledges, Pinckneys, and Middletons-who enjoyed the
vast wealth generated by their slaves in the rice fields. For them,
England was the only place where an education befitting a member
of the landed gentry could be had.129 When they returned to
Charleston, their compensation was on a lordly scale. John
Rutledge is said to have earned twenty thousand dollars a year at
the bar in early-nineteenth-century Charleston, "for that time a
fabulous sum of money."" °
This was the type of man who sat on the South Carolina
bench-steeped in the English legal tradition, and backed by the
immense power of the rice-planter caste. It is not surprising to
find the South Carolina Constitutional Court, sitting regally in
Charleston, waving away objections to a judge's comments on the
evidence by quoting Hale."'3 South Carolina held to the English idea
that the judge and jury were partners, not combatants: "[Als the
jury assists the judge in determining matters of fact; so the judge
assists the jury in determining matters of law." 112 In the best
English style, it was a judge's "duty to aid the jury, in forming an
opinion of the evidence."'
126. See 1 ANTON-HERMA4N CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA
302-04 (1965).
127. See HOYT P. CANADY, GENTLEMEN OF THE BAR LAWYERS IN COLONIAL SOUTH
CAROLINA 212-15 (Harold Hyman & Stuart Bruchey eds., 1987).
128. See 1 CHROUST, supra note 126, at 304.
129. See CANADY, supra note 127, at 206; CHROUST, supra note 126, at 304.
130. 1 CHROUST, supra note 126, at 306. See also CANADY, supra note 127, at 319-22
(discussing the relative wealth of prominent Charleston lawyers).
131. See Kinloch v. Palmer, 8 S.C.L. (1 Mil) 216, 227-28 (1817).
132. HALE, supra note 25, at 256-57, quoted in Kinloch, 8 S.C.L. (1 Mill) at 227-28.
133. State v. Bennet, 5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) 514, 514 (1815).
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2. The Courtrooms of the South and West
In contrast, the atmosphere of most southern and western
courtrooms often made it difficult for a judge to maintain basic
order, let alone control of counsel and a guiding role respecting the
jury. The courtrooms of the Southwest and West were a far cry from
the decorous scenes of the eastern cities. The East had imposing or
at least solid courthouses, and the formal dress ofjudges, lawyers,
and audience fostered judicial dignity. But the courtrooms of the
frontier were often built of "round logs, fresh from the adjacent
forest," with the people inside dressed to match in hunting shirts
and moccasins. 1
34
One lawyer visiting from New York described the scene he
encountered in an Illinois courtroom: "To us, just from the city of
New Yorkwith the sleek lawyers and the prim and dignified judges,
and audiences to correspond, there was a contrast so great, that it
was almost impossible to repress a burst of laughter." 135 Judge
Stephen T. Logan-who was, as it happened, a good lawyer-was
seated on the bench, "with his chair tilted back and his heel as high
as his head, and in his mouth a veritable corn cob pipe; his hair
standing nine ways for Sunday, while his clothing was more like
that worn by a woodchopper than anybody else." 136 A railing held
the audience at bay, "outside of which smoking and spitting and
chewing of tobacco seemed to be the principal employment."3 7
Liquor flowed freely at court sessions, and the audiences,
lawyers, and judges were frequently mildly tipsy and sometimes
more than that. A Virginia lawyer noted:
Many terms of court in the olden days have been marked by
heavy drinking at the Virginia county seats. When court
convened it was an event of widespread interest among the
people and the lawyers, as well as the citizens in many
instances, imbibed freely in celebration of the occasion. 3 8
134. J.G.M. RAMSEY, ANNALs OF TENNESSEE 281 (Charleston, J. Russell 1853).
135. HISTORYOFSANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS 183 (Chicago, Inter-State Publ'g Co. 1881).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. JOHN H. GWATHMEY, LEGENDS OF VIRGINIA COURTHOUSES 69 (1933); see also id. at
69-73 (linking drinking with impassioned oratory and lawyers insulting the judge in open
court). After being challenged to a duel by a drunken lawyer in open court, "[tihe old Judge,
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In the 1820s, Judge Child of Mississippi was often found on the
bench in some of the newly settled counties "when so much
[overpowered] with the draughts of intoxicating drink which he had
recently imbibed, that, notwithstanding his ability and learning, he
was wholly incapable of conducting the business of the court in a
decent and orderly manner."" 9 On one infamous occasion, during
the trial of an important case, he called up to the bench "a drunken
attorney to preside in his stead, whilst he went across the public
square to a low drinking shop to 'wet his whistle,' as he said."14 A
prominent Mississippi lawyer later wrote that Child's conduct led
directly to Mississippi's relatively early provision for election of
judges.' It seems not unlikely that this and similar incidents also
led to Mississippi's especially draconian statutes against trial
judges commenting on evidence. 42 In such an atmosphere, judges,
lawyers, jurors, and the audience were not well disposed to calm
and dispassionate comment on the facts.
3. The Homines Novi: Southwestern Lawyers
The bench and bar of the South and Southwest corresponded
with their raw surroundings. Lawyers were often rough and ready,
far from learned in English or any other law, and independent-
minded. Eager to take advantage of opportunities on the new
frontier, they flooded into new areas where litigation was likely to
be common.1 43 They would not even submit to the forms of showing
respect for the judges, which helps explain why battles between the
bench and bar could grow so fierce in these areas. Lawyers and
realizing that all the lawyers and most of tha court officials and jurymen were about three
sheets in the wind and that he had taken a few that morning himself, adjourned court sine
die, and they all went over to the tavern." Id. at 72.
139. HENRY S. FOOTE, THE BENCH AND BAR OF THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST 21 (St. Louis,
Soule, Thomas & Wentworth 1876).
140. Id.
141. See id. at 22; Hall, supra note 107, at 337.
142. See infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
143. Andrew Jackson's policy of removing Indians from the Southwest led to a swarm of
lawyers descending on Mississippi and nearby states in the early-to-mid-1830s to take
advantage of the land litigation that would inevitably follow. See FOOTE, supra note 139, at
45.
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judges hurled insults at each other in open court and challenged
each other to duels.' The prevalence of physical and verbal
violence on a frontier composed of settlers from diverse
backgrounds is readily understandable-in the South, it was
exacerbated by the violence associated with slaveholding. 45 Such
conduct was far less tolerated in the North, where judges
commanded at least the outward forms of respect and maintained
their closer, informal relationship to the jury.
Contemporary observers noted the increased aggressiveness of
the new lawyers of the South. These new men or homines novi, as
they were known in the South, with its love of classical allusion,
generated an atmosphere of intense competition in both the political
and legal arenas."' They had no patience for anyone wh6 tried to
stand in their way, including judges. One contemporary observer
described this type of man as "an able speaker and good lawyer;
bold, ready, regardless of respect to opposing counsel, witnesses, or
clients, and unscrupulous as to the language in which he expressed
his contempt; skilled in cajoling the jury and bullying the judge."'4'
Lawyers of the old school feared to face him as an adversary. "One
purpose only seemed to govern him-the purpose to gain his case at
all hazards."'48
Andrew Jackson is a case in point. A destitute orphan from South
Carolina, he moved to frontier Tennessee at age seventeen and
144. See, e.g., infra note 216 and accompanying text (describing Archibald Maclaine of
North Carolina storming and ranting against Judge Spencer in open court-a not uncommon
event); supra note 138 (describing a Virginia lawyer swearing at the judge and challenging
him to a duel in open court).
145. Robert Cottrol has suggested that much of what we think of as nineteenth-century
frontier violence was more southern than western in character and often associated with
slaveholding. See Robert J. Cottrol, Submission is not the Answer: Lethal Violence,
Microcultures of Criminal Violence and the Right to Self-Defense, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029,
1050-51 (1998); see also HINDUS, supra note 14, at 33-55 (describing the extralegal authority
existing in South Carolina, including mobs, duels and regulation of morals); ROGER LANE,
MURDER INAMERICA: AHISTORY 151-56 (1997) (discussing the prevalence of lynching in the
South); Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen be Acting Efficiently?, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 325-29 (1984) (addressing the relationship between dueling and the
legal system).
146. See 2 CHROUST, supra note 126, at 87.
147. WILLIAMi J. GRAYSON, JAMES LOUIS PETIGRU: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 89-90 (New
York, Harper & Bros. 1866) (emphasis added); see WILLIAM R. TAYLOR, CAVALIER AND
YANKEE: THE OLD SOUTH AND AMERICAN NATIONAL CHARACTER 58-59 (1963).
148. GRAYSON, supra note 147, at 90.
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joined a law office as a student."9 His studies, however, seem to
have taken a back seat to his considerable penchant for
horseplay. 5 ' A few years later, he hung out his shingle and became
in turn a pleader in court, attorney general for a local district, and
ajudge-advocate in the militia. Like many of his brothers in the law
on the frontier, he plunged into land speculation, politics, and
dueling.
Dueling was rampant in the South among the bar and as a
method of settling legal disputes in general. It was widely
acknowledged at the time-even by southerners themselves-that
such dueling led to a general breakdown in respect for the rule of
law and greater violence beyond the actual duels.' 5 ' Dueling eroded
the authority of those in formal positions of power, including judges.
A judge, like anyone else, could be called out and forced to put his
life on the line. The southern code of honor was powerful, 152 and
among lawyers and politicians a handy way of intimidating
opponents. Jackson was a celebrated master of the art. His first
duel, at the age of twenty-one, arose out of name calling in a
courtroom-a typical cause.153 On that occasion, he shot into the air,
but thereafter he generally shot to kill and succeeded.' 5 '
149. See 11 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 732-37 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes
eds., 1999).
150. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Legal Practice ofAndrew Jackson, reprinted in THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: MAJOR HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS 259, 260-61 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987).
151. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE
FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849, at 248 (John
Ross Browne ed., Arno Press 1973) (1850) [hereinafter BROWNE DEBATES] (remarks of W.M.
Gwin) ("Sir, I have all my life lived in States where dueling was countenanced; and I have
had sad cause to know and feel its evil consequences. [In Mississippi,] whenever a man got
into a warm political contest, he went about with pistols."); id. at 247 (remarks of W.S.
Sherwood) ("Where duelling is most practised, you see other evils; you see street fights every
day. The very fact that duelling is permitted, seems to encourage all kinds of sanguinary
conflicts between man and man.).
152. See, e.g., EDWARD AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE
19TH-CENTURYAMERICAN SOUTH 9-33 (1984); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE MILITANT SOUTH:
1800-1861, at 44-62 (1956); STEVEN M. STOWE, INTIMACY AND POWER IN THE OLD SOUTH:
RITUAL IN THE LIVES OF THE PLANTERS 5-49 (1987); BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN
HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH 350-61 (1982); see also CHRISTINE LEIGH
HEYR AN, SOUTHERN CROSS: THE BEGINNINGS OFTHE BIBLE BELT 245-49 (1997) (describing
how the concept ofsouthern honorwas so pervasive that it.influenced southern Christianity).
153. See ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE,
1767-1821, at 38-39 (1977).
154. See id. at 39, 120-23, 142, 184-85.
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The "new men" heaped abuse on each other in the courtroom,
,provoking duels by accusations of the three worst crimes a southern
man could think of: "lying, cheating, and cohabiting with Ne-
groes."'55 The territorial government and legal system of Arkansas
were essentially run by dueling, and in 1824, a superior court judge
was killed in a duel by a colleague on the bench over a game of
cards.'56 The intelligent and well-educated, but drunken and
disorderly Judge Child of the Mississippi Supreme Court was said
to have "believed devoutly in the dueling code" 5' and dueled with
the prominent General Joor, a friend of John C. Calhoun. Both were
severely wounded, though not fatally.'58
The dueling situation was so bad in Tennessee that a duel in
which a Tennessee lawyer killed a man in Kentucky provoked a
long and impassioned opinion from a judge of the Tennessee
Supreme Court, when the dueler tried to attack his disbarment.
Respected Judge Catron did his best to impose order: "Let it be once
understood that the bar of Tennessee dare not fight"; whoever did
so would be disbarred.'59 "The truth is, such men are too often
insolent and impudent bullies, who tyrannise over, and impose
upon, all orderly men about them; who literally dragoon society, by
fear of personal violence, into silence and seeming acquiescence,
with respect to their conduct." 60 Despite the infamous northern
155. Frances McCurdy, Courtroom Oratory of the Pioneer Period, 56 MO. HIST. REV. 1, 7
(1961).
156. See MALCOLM J. ROHRBOUGH, THE TRANs-APPALACHIAN FRONTIER: PEOPLE,
SOCIETIES, AND INSTITUTIONS, 1775-1850, at 273-77 (1978).
157. FOOTE, supra note 139, at 20.
158. See id. at 22-23.
159. Smith v. State, 7 Tenn. 207, 212, 1 Yer. 228, 234 (1829). Foote, a lawyer and
contemporary ofCatron's, quoted this opinion admiringly. See FOOTE, supra note 139, at 145,
150. Other lawyers did not hesitate to express their scorn for Catron's decision, even to his
face. Judge Catron had been known as a fighting lawyer himself, and he wrote:
I was scorched with many a racy sarcasm; such as, that a sinner who had
carried blank challenges in the crown of his hat, and slept with his pistols
under his head, was a very proper man to turn saint and lecturer, to put down
a vice he so well understood in all its bearings.
Biographical 'Letter from Justice Catron (Dec. 24, 1851), in PORTRAITS OF EMINENT
AMERICANS Now LIVING 73, 77 (John Livingston ed., New York, Sampson, Low, Son & Co.
1854). Interestingly, Judge Catron was a friend and prot~g6 of Jackson's-Jackson put him
on the U.S. Supreme Court a day or two before Jackson left office. See id. Huebner's book on
the southern judiciary contains a fine portrait of Judge Catron and the Smith decision. See
HUEBNER, supra note 14, at 40-41, 45-47, 64-65.
160. Smith, 7 Tenn. at 212, 1 Yer. at 234.
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duel between Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr, dueling was
very rare in the North and Northwest, 1 which helped greatly in
maintaining respect for authority and decorum.
The swashbuckling homines novi were also financial buccaneers,
and had won freedom from judges' control in the all-important
matter of fees. In general, lawyers in America were more
entrepreneurial and free from the control of the court than their
English counterparts, and this was especially true in the South and
West. In England, courts exercised a fair degree of control over fees.
The two-way fee-shifting rifle meant that legal fees were taxed as
costs by the court, and so regulated.162 In addition, English courts
banned contingency fee contracts as champertous 63
American courts, in contrast, rejected fee shifting and so closed
down one possible avenue of regulating fees.'64 In the early
nineteenth century, if not before, American lawyers also managed
to wriggle free of various attempts to create fee scales, insisting on
freedom of contract.165 The same emphasis on freedom of contract
allowed them gradually to break down the barriers to contingency
fee contracts, and by the mid-nineteenth century these were
widespread. 6 6 Contingency fee litigation was especially dense in
newly settled areas such as Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, with
their tangle of land claims. 67 The new South and West allowed this
business-oriented, unrestrained approach to lawyering to deepen
and flourish.
4. The New Style of Trial: Emotional Speechifying
Southern and western lawyers at this time were similarly
unrestrained in their rhetoric. We have seen how the main concern
of the judges and lawyers who favored judges commenting on
161. See, e.g., BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 151, at 247 ("You hear of no duelling, as a
general thing, in the Northern States.").
162. See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History ofthe American Rule on Fee Recovery, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9, 16.
163. See Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning
of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 231, 232 (1998).
164. See id. at 234-36.
165. See Leubsdorf, supra note 162, at 16.
166. See id.
167. See Karsten, supra note 163, at 236.
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evidence was that the eloquence of counsel might unjustly carry
away the jury. 68 This concern was entirely justified. The first half
of the nineteenth century exalted what Sarah Barringer Gordon has
called "a culture of emotional speechifying." ' 9 Lawyers took full
advantage of it, and resented any interference caused by the judge
commenting calmly on the evidence. It is no coincidence that those
lawyers who were most in favor of restricting judges' ability to
comment also used the most hyperbolic rhetoric.
170
Conditions in the South and West made such rhetoric especially
powerful. Frontier culture was not notably literate: in place of
reading, frontiersmen and women relied on oral interaction.17' The
result was a tidal wave of popular emotional oratory that proved
very difficult for southern and western judges to control. Lawyers
there were entertainment stars; people came from miles around
when the courts were in session to hear a good case.'12 Courtroom
drama was also popular entertainment in England, but the focus
there tended to be on the intrinsic interest of the testimony in a
particular case.13 In the American South and West, people came
mainly to hear the lawyers. 74
Mid-nineteenth-century lawyers followed the lead of religious
revivalists such as Charles Grandison Finney, who elevated
emotional intensity over intellect or traditional doctrinal
authority.17 The links between the genres of sermon and courtroom
argument were profound. Finney himself was a "recovering lawyer"
who preached in business clothes and "literally 'made a case' for
168. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
169. Sarah Barringer Gordon, Blasphemy and Religious Liberty in Antebellum America
5 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, cited with permission, copy on file with author).
170. See infra text accompanying notes 254-56.
171. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 312; RAMSEY, supra note 134, at 732-35.
172. See, e.g., FOOTE, supra note 139, at 10.
173. There were a few exceptional lawyers, such as Erskine and Curran, whom people
came to hear, but even they were mainly famous for arguments in political cases. See
SPEECHES OF LORD ERSKINE, WHILEATTHE BAR (James L. High ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1993) (1876); THE SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN PHILPOT CURRAN (Thomas
Davis ed., 3d ed., Dublin, J. Duffy 1862).
174. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 312. Some northern lawyers, most notably Daniel
Webster, could also pack courtrooms with large crowds and play to them. See id. at 312-14.
175. See Gordon, supra note 169, at 9.
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faith, exhorting his listeners as he would a jury, persuading them
through eloquence of the merits of his client, Jesus. 176 Similar to
the revivalists, many lawyers were happy to discard doctrinal rigor
in favor of playing on the jury's emotions through vivid storytelling
and inflammatory rhetoric. The growing lyceum movement
-together with quasi-religious fora such as temperance movement
speeches-provided a training ground for aspiring young lawyers to
hone their impassioned rhetoric. By the end of the 1830s, almost
every medium-sized town throughout the country had a lyceum,
organizing speeches and sponsoring debates.177 The terms "lawyer"
and "speechmaker" were practically synonymous, and in 1819,
attorneys in Missouri called themselves "orators."178
Courtroom forensics were the ultimate debate-a man's life could
depend on it. The actual taking of testimony was much swifter than
it is today, allowing excitement among the audience to build
without boredom setting in, as it surely would now in virtually
every significant trial. The excitement reached a climax at closing
arguments. The lawyers went at it with every ounce of persuasive
power they could muster. If a judge had then presumed to give an
extensive charge, such as Judge Ruffin recommended, laying out
"his own calm, discreet, sensible and impartial summary of the
case,"179 the effect would have been anticlimactic in the extreme.
The whole effect on the jury and the audience that the lawyers had
worked so hard to whip up might have collapsed. The lawyers'
176. Id. at 10.
177. See PAULBOYERURBANMASSESANDMoRALORDERINAMERICA, 1820-1920, at 109-12
(1978); Mary Kupiec Cayton, The Making of an American Prophet: Emerson, His Audiences,
and the Rise of the Culture Industry in Nineteenth-Century America, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 597,
604-07 (1987). Lincoln's astounding 1838 speech on "The Perpetuation of Our Political
Institutions" was delivered at the Springfield Young Men's Lyceum, and illustrates the
lyceum's value as an outlet for young, ambitious lawyers. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD,
LINcOLN 80 (1995). In that speech, of course, Lincoln attacked the prevailing emotionalism
of politics as a danger to the nation's "proud fabric of freedom."Id. He urged that the country
turn to "reason, cold, calculating, unimpassioned reason" as a means of restraining men of
overweening ambition (such as himself) from taking advantage of the slavery question to
make a name for themselves. Id. at 81-82.
178. 2 CHROUST, supra note 126, at 108 (quoting John Moreland, Notice of Deposition, Mo.
INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 19, 1819, at 4).
179. State v. Moses, 13 N.C. 292, 296, 2 Dev. 452, 458 (1830).
235
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
professional reputations, and in many cases their political
ambitions, depended on their powerful oratory. Southern-and many
western-judges were not strong enough to assert this power in the
teeth of the lawyers and the audience. They took a different tack:
they fell back on the expensive remedy of new trial.
We see the true flavor of the southern courtroom in a trial near
Huntsville, Alabama in the 1820s. 8 ' A bitter feud had sprung up
between two wealthy men from northern Alabama: Smith, who had
married the niece of one of Andrew Jackson's bitterest enemies, and
Donelson, a nephew of Jackson's wife. Donelson publicly insulted
Smith, and Smith sued him for slander. Donelson's defense was
that his insult was justified. Trial was to be had in a small village,
and as the day drew near, the friends and adherents of the litigants
began to fill up the surrounding area. Donelson's witnesses were so
numerous that they overflowed the local tavern and had to camp
out in the fields. Each side had hired four or five lawyers to work on
the case. The trial lasted several days-a long time for the period.'81
All were waiting for the closing arguments. Finally they came. In
Foote's estimation, "The speech of Judge Hopkins [then counsel for
Smith, the plaintiff] was most masterly. I do not know that I have
heard it since surpassed."'82 Hopkins "analyzed the testimony fully;
he explained the legal principles involved with a power and
earnestness which filled all present with admiration; his peroration
was marked with the most soul-moving and overwhelming
eloquence. " "'8 Judge Kelly, then counsel for Donelson, the
defendant, began his response. Foote described the scene:
180. The account is given in FOOTE, supra note 139, at 9-11.
181. Foote noted: "It had not then become fashionable to occupy seven or eight weeks in
the trial of a single case, and the arts of procrastination, now so freely allowed in certain
localities [Foote was writing in the 1870s], for the spread of social excitement and the
diffusion of forensic fame, would have been then nowhere tolerated." Id. at 10. Foote was a
former U.S. senator and a "moderate" Jacksonian Democrat. See 8 AMERICAN NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY, supra note 149, at 193-94.
182. FOOTE, supra note 139, at 10.
183. Id.
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I doubt exceedingly whether a more telling and effective
forensic speech has ever been made on either side of the
Atlantic since the days of Erskine and Curran. He was logical,
he was facetious, he was pathetic, be [sic] was denunciatory, by
turns; and he seemed to wield the jury as a boy would do his
playthings. The presidential contest between Jackson and
Adams had just occurred, and the whole public mind of
Alabama had been inflamed almost to madness by the fierce
discussions of the period. The members of the jury were all
Jackson men. Right well did Juge [sic] Kelly know this
important fact, and right adroitly did he take advantage of it.
He alluded more than once to the fact that Donelson was the
nephew of the hero of New Orleans, and that his antagonist was
the nephew, by marriage, of one of his bitterest foes. As he
thundered forth his furious invective, the faces of the jury were
ablaze with partzan [sic] excitement and indignation. They
retired, under the charge of the court to the room assigned them
for conference; but no conference there took place. Their minds
were already made up. A loud "hurrah for Jackson" was heard
as they left the court room, and a few minutes thereafter, they
returned with a verdict for the defendant; which verdict the
Judge, thoughhimself an ardent Jackson man, set aside at once
without waiting for a motion to be made for that purpose.'
A number of things are notable about this account. The law-
yers-not the judge or the witnesses or the parties-were clearly the
stars of the show. Their rhetorical powers are lionized, and in
particular Kelly is praised for his skill in inflaming the partisanship
of the jury. At trial, the judge did little to counteract that partisan
appeal. His charge was deemed to be utterly unimportant, and only
mentioned in passing. The jury seemed to take no notice of it
whatever. The judge did have one remaining power to affect the
verdict: grimly doing his duty despite his own partisan sentiments,
he pulled out his ultimate weapon, the new trial. He was for all
intents and purposes silenced during the trial, and could only resort
to an expensive and limited remedy. The demands of the dramatic,
184. Id. at 11.
237
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
entertainment style of trial thus ran into direct conflict with a
judge's power to comment.
This dramatic style of trial caught on in the West as well as the
South. People flocked to see the lawyers.185 So great was the
popular pressure to put on a good show that a judge on the western
frontier was embarrassed if there was no ferocious rhetorical battle
going on in his courtroom. Some judges would privately tell the
lawyers to pull no punches (verbally, at least), and to give everyone
their money's worth.'86
Often the spectators were so swept away by a lawyer's speech
that they started shouting and stamping on the floor. Courtrooms
could resemble camp revivals, that other great staple of release and
entertainment (as well as genuine religious fervor) on the frontier,
complete with ecstatic cries. One listener in a Missouri courtroom
shouted to the defense lawyer, "Go it my little Johnson! Rise and
shine, honey; live in the milk and die in the cream!"
18 7
Sometimes lawyers did not pull real punches; fistfights between
lawyers in open court were not uncommon. Judges did not interfere
immediately, so as not to ruin the entertainment, and afterwards
simply fined the offenders-a fine that would be remitted once the
pugilists had reconciled and asked the court's pardon. 8 Order and
rationality were not keynotes of the western courtroom in the early
days.
In a mode that is familiar to us today, southern and western
lawyers used their rhetorical powers-unhampered by the judge-to
play on national and regional prejudices to overcome legal
arguments. Often, anything that smacked of the English common
law was suspect.'8 9 That included judges commenting on the
185. See, e.g., HISTORY OF SANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS, supra note 135, at 183.
186. See O.H. SMITH, EARLY INDIANA TRIALS AND SKETCHES 5-7 (Cincinnati 1858).
187. Banton G. Boone, A Cause Celebre-Birch vs. Benton, in THE HISTORYOFTHE BENCH
AND BAR OF MISSOURI 381 (A.J.D. Stewart ed., St. Louis, Legal Publ'g Co. 1898).
188. See 2 CHROUST, supra note 126, at 102.
189. See id. at 105. An Indiana lawyer who had some learning in the law once dared refer
to "the great English common law." Id. His opponent won the jury's approval by exclaiming,
"If we are to be guided by English law at all, we want their best law, not their common law.
We want a law as good as Queen Victoria herself makes use of; for, gentlemen, we are
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evidence.' 90 Eastern law was also viewed with suspicion. In Illinois,
a lawyer once tried to support his argument in a case involving title
to a mill by quoting Johnson's New York Reports. 9 ' Opposing
counsel responded by telling the jury that Johnson was a "Yankee
clock-peddler,"112 who had been going up and down the country
"gathering up rumors and floating stories against the people of the
west, and had them published in a book entitled 'Johnson's
Reports.""93 He indignantly exclaimed, "Gentlemen of the jury, I
am sure you will not believe anything that comes from such a
source; and, besides, what did Johnson know about Joe Duncan's
mills?"'94 This argument carried the day, and the jury found for his
client.195
5. Lawyers in Politics
Lawyers' rhetorical skills, and the renown gained by exercising
them in the courtroom, served them well in another arena: politics.
The southern or western lawyer was deeply involved in politics, to
a greater extent than his northern counterpart. 9 ' Lawyers in the
sovereigns here." Id. He went on:
But we don't want no English law. United States' law is good enough for us; yes,
Indi-a-na law is good enough for an Indiana jury; and so I know you will con-
vince the worthy gentleman who has come here to insult your patriotism and
good sense, by attempting to influence your decision through the common law
of England.
Id. Southern and western judges were themselves often impatient of citations of precedent
and legal authorities. See, e.g., FOOTE, supra note 139, at 20-21 (describing Mississippi's
Judge Child's impatience with lengthy citations from "musty volumes"); HUEBNER, supra
note 14, at 44-45 (describing the viewof Tennessean Judge Catron-a Jacksonian of humble
origins and little formal education-that such citations were "an address of vanity to
ignorance and pedantry").
190. See, e.g., BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 151, at 234-35 (remarks of C.T. Botts).
191. See JOSEPH GILLESPIE, RECOLLECTIONS OF EARLY ILLINOIS AND HER NOTED MEN 21
(Chicago, Fergus Printing Co. 1880) (Fergus Historical Series No. 13).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id. Gillespie included this episode to illustrate the "'clap-trap' employed in early
times to humbug the juries by a certain class of lawyers." Id.
196. Bloomfield has shown how the northern ideal of the lawyer during this period was
withdrawn from politics. See Maxwell Bloomfield, Law vs. Politics: The Self-Image of the
American Bar (1830-1860), 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 306, 314-17 (1968); see also WILLIAM
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North lamented that "[tihe day is past when the lawyer can call
upon the legislature to assert his rights." 97 This was not so in the
South and West. There, lawyers had some leverage within state
legislatures and conventions to pass measures favorable to their
interests, though they had to be careful how they used it. The
difficulty was that lawyers were to some extent tarred with the
same aristocratic brush that judges were, in the populist democratic
view.
After the advent of Jacksonian democracy, despite the fact
Jackson himself had been a lawyer, attacks on the organized bar
grew apace. The bar, after all, claimed special privileges and
monopolies based on expertise.' 9 Legislatures cut down or in some
cases even eliminated requirements for admission to the bar.'99 The
result was that numerous bar associations, especially in New
England, folded in the 1830s.2 °° Interestingly, the southern bar
associations seemed to have survived the populist storm better than
the northern ones, perhaps because they more quickly adopted-and
indeed took advantage of-the populist spirit of the times.2° '
Because of this populist spirit, lawyers sometimes had difficulty
passing provisions favoring their interests.0 2 But when it came to
WESTON FISHER III, THE LAW OF THE LAND: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
PROPERTYDOCTRINE, 1776-1880, at 74-77 (1991) (discussing the withdrawal of lawyers from
electoral politics during the antebellum period). In contrast, southern lawyers were deeply
involved in politics. See, e.g., JAMES W. GORDON, LAWYERS IN POLITICS: MID-NINETEENTH
CENTURY KENTUCKY AS A CASE STUDY 47-80 (1990).
197. New Publications: R~gles sur la Profession d'Avocat, 7 PA. L.J. 98, 99 (1847) (book
review).
198. One Jacksonian denounced the "secret trades union of lawyers, called the bar, that
has always regulated the price of their own labor and by the strictest concert contrived to
limit competition." FREDERICKROBINSON,APROGRAMFORLABOR (1834), reprinted in SOCIAL
THEORIES OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 329 (Joseph L. Blau ed., 1947). If the organized bar
were investigated, Robinson claimed, "[wie shall discover that by means of this regularly
organized combination of lawyers throughout the land the whole government of the nation
has always been in their hands." Id. at 330. Roscoe Pound thoroughly documented the
Jacksonian anti-lawyer movement. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO
MODERN TIMES 232-42. (1953).
199. In 1800, fifteen out of nineteen states or territories insisted on minimum periods of
preparation before joining the bar; by 1840, only eleven out of thirty did so. See 2 CHRoUST,
supra note 126, at 166-67. New Hampshire (after 1842), Maine (after 1843), and Wisconsin
(after 1849) allowed any citizen to practice law on proof of good moral character. See id. at
158.
200. See id. at 157-60.
201. See id. at 152-53.
202. This was particularly true of broad rights of appeal, which lay people saw as simply
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provisions limiting the power of judges to comment on evidence,
lawyers could successfully wield populist rhetoric without worrying
that it would be turned against them. They worked at casting
judges as aristocrats seeking to trample the power of the people in
the form of the jury. 0 3 To laypeople, it may well have seemed that,
as between judges and lawyers, the more numerous lawyers were
the less aristocratic of the two.
Lawyers did what they could to make themselves seem as
democratic as possible, pointing out that they came from all social
backgrounds and were involved in numerous pursuits besides
law. 0 4 As we will see in the next part, lawyers played a leading role
in putting these restrictions into law. This is not to say that all
lawyers favored these restrictions, or favored the same degree of
restriction; there were political differences among them just as
there are political differences today." 5 But in the South and West,
groups of lawyers succeeded in getting these limits on judges
through legislatures and constitutional conventions. The culture
was receptive to these limitations on the judge.
III. THE MOVEMENT TO CURB THE POWER
Now that certain aspects of the South and West's legal and social
culture have been described, we will examine how provisions
opportunities for lawyers to fleece their clients. The North Carolina Assembly, for example,
was reluctant to provide for an appellate court in the early nineteenth century because of
"suspicion that the lawyers were pushing this measure for their own emolument." Battle,
supra note 121, at 476. In the California Constitution Convention of 1849, delegates
vigorously debated whether to have a $200 minimum amount in controversy for appeal to the
Supreme Court. See BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 151, at 225. Several laypeople forcefully
accused lawyers of encouraging appeals in hopeless or trivial cases to pile up fees, one saying
that lawyers"pounce upon" their clients"like vultures upon dead bodies."Id. at 228 (remarks
of Mr. Noriego); see also id. at 226, 232 (remarks of Mr. McCarver); id. at 231 (remarks of E.
Brown). The lawyers fought back, but the provision passed nonetheless. See id. at 233.
203. See the arguments ofWaterman, supra text accompanyingnote 60, Deford, infra text
accompanying notes 282-84, and Botts, infra text accompanying note 255-56.
204. See, e.g., The Legal Profession, 13 S. & W. LITERARY MESSENGER & REv. 356, 358
(1847); Hall, supra note 107, at Inaugural Address of Hon. A Caruthers, Professor of Law
in Cumberland University, Lebanon, Tennessee, 3 U.S. MONTHLY L. MAG. 542 (1851).
205. It is important to note, though, that law practice was not as specialized then as it
became in the late nineteenth century. There was no separate plaintiffs' bar or defense bar;
lawyers switched back and forth all the time in the early nineteenth century. Abraham
Lincoln's career is a perfect example. See DONALD, supra note 177, at 97, 103-06. So we do
not see then any division between a "populist" plaintiffs' bar or "conservative" defense bar.
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restricting the judge's ability to comment passed into law in
particular states. As we have seen, most states allowed judicial
comment on evidence in the first half of the nineteenth century,
New York being the recognized leader." 6 But, even early in the
century, a few states struck out on their own and denied judges the
power. These were all states of the upper South: North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Maryland. Virginia courts, although they seem not
to have explicitly barred comment on evidence until 1854, did not
approve of it even early on. North Carolina's early restriction was
born in part of a battle between the bench and bar. This battle was
waged in the southern style described above; emotions ran high,
and insults flew back and forth in open court. Tennessee, with its
strong settler links to North Carolina, constitutionalized the rule in
1796 and from there it spread throughout the South and West: In
a few states, the courts themselves imposed the restrictions without
waiting for the legislature or a constitutional convention to do so.
Throughout the South and West, lawyers were key players in the
conventions and legislatures that imposed restrictions.
A. The Legislative and Constitutional Movement
1. North Carolina: A Battle Between the Bench and Bar
North Carolina broke away from the common law practice in
1796, and it did so by statute.0 7 In the years leading up to 1796, a
feud raged between the bench and bar of North Carolina. Under the
Constitution of 1776 of the Free State of North Carolina, the first
judges elected by the legislature were Samuel Ashe, Samuel
Spencer, and James Iredell. °8 Iredell (later a United States
Supreme Court justice) soon resigned, and John Williams took his
place.0 9 These three men all held office until well into the
1790s-through war, economic depression, the adoption of the new
federal Constitution, and the birth of the new party politics. They
206. See, e.g., Frederick v. Gaston, 1 Greene 401, 404 (Iowa 1848) ("In many of the States
of the Union, in New York in particular, it is the practice of the courts to charge the jury
upon facts.").
207. See An Act to Secure the Impartiality of Trial by Jury, and to Direct the Conduct of
Judges in Charges to the Petit Jury, ch. IV, § 1, 1796 N.C. Laws 3.
208. See Battle, supra note 121, at 468-69.
209. See id. at 469.
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constituted the entire judiciary of the state, being both trial judges,
sitting alone, and appellate judges, sitting en banc. 1 °
None of these judges had any great legal training. Ashe, indeed,
was a lawyer, but "the character of the practice and the turbulence
of the tim[els" did not allow him to devote himself to professional
learning.211 Spencer had been a clerk of Anson Court, but it is
unclear whether he was in fact a lawyer. 2  Williams was a
carpenter.1 3 In addition to ignorance, the judges were charged with
partiality.
2 14
The lawyers who practiced before them chafed under their
control. It was said of two of the most prominent lawyers-John Hay
and Archibald Maclaine-that when they were irritated, they had
"tongues sharp as a scorpion's sting."215 One of the main sources of
irritation was interference from the judge when they were
presenting a case. A fellow lawyer, William Hooper, wrote to
Iredell:
Our court at Wilmington went on in the old dilatory mode of
doing business. Great threats of despatch accomplished in the
usual way. Much conversation from Germanicus [Spencer] on
the bench; his vanity has become insufferable, and is
accompanied with the most overbearing insolence. Maclaine and
he had a terrible "fracas." Germanicus, with those strong
intuitive powers with which he is inspired, took up Maclaine's
defence in an ejectment, and ran away with it before it was
opened. Maclaine expostulated, scolded, stormed, called names,
abandoned the cause. I prevailed. Spencer made conde-
scensions; hostilities ceased, and peace was restored. 16
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See Ud.
214. A member ofthe Assembly wrote to Iredell, "[tihe most shameful partiality disgraced
the Bench," culminating in the near refusal of the judges to recognize an order they had
previously made. Letter from Archibald Maclaine to James Iredell (Aug. 3, 1786), in 2 LIFE
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 143 (photo. reprint 1949) (Griffith J. McRee ed.,
New York, Appleton 1857) [hereinafter MCREE]. In another letter, Maclaine reported: "The
criminal business has been trifling, and no otherwise remarkable than for trifling fines for
atrocious trespasses, when the favorites of the Court were defendants; and heavy fines, when
the malice of the Judges was to be gratified." Letter from Archibald Maclaine to James
Iredell (July 11, 1787), in 2 MCREE, supra, at 164.
215. Battle, supra note 121, at 470.
216. Letter from William Hooper to James Iredell (July 6, 1785), in 2 MCREE, supra note
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It is hard to imagine a similar scene before Chancellor Kent or
Justice Story. Right after this passage Hooper wrote that the courts
must be reformed, and that "[a]gainst the present system the cries
of the people are loud."217 But, he said, "what affects me most is,
that the censure is pointed at the Bar, when the occasion is seated
much higher."218 The judges were winning the public relations war
against the lawyers.
Matters finally came to a head over the treatment of British
Loyalists. In 1786 the legislature passed an act forbidding people
whose property had been confiscated (Loyalists) from bringing
suit.2 9 This had been a profitable area of litigation for the lawyers;
Hooper was so incensed by the act that he proposed to Iredell that
it be called "a bill inflicting pains and penalties on attorneys."220
The lawyers were further riled when the three judges proved
vigorous in their enforcement of the act.221 To top it all off, the court
banished two Tories without any statutory authorization to do so.
222
The bar was in an uproar, and in 1786 John Hay introduced
resolutions of impeachment in the legislature against the three
214, at 125; see Battle, supra note 121, at 470. Such episodes were by no means uncommon.
Hooper told Iredell of another, this one involving Judge Ashe and John Hay:
Ashe and Hay had a terrible squabble at Wilmington. Ashe, from the Bench,
told Hay that his conduct in the Admiralty to the Judge thereof ought to have
been answered with a cane; and directed the Attorney General to indict him
and Speller for "champerty." Judge how Hay felt: he behaved with becoming
temper, and decency; but nourishes, I fancy, a flame in his bosom that will burn
furiously when it vents itself.
Letter from William Hooper to James Iredell (Feb. 7, 1784), in 2 MCREE, supra note 214, at
89-90; see also Letter from Archibald Maclaine to James Iredell (July 11, 1787), in 2 McREE,
supra note 214, at 164 (discussing Spiller's written demand for an apology from Ashe).
217. Letter from William Hooper to James Iredell (July 6, 1785), in 2 MCREE, supra note
214, at 125-26.
218. Id. at 126.
219. See 2 SAMUEL A'COURT ASHE, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 45 (1925).
220. Letter from William Hooper to James Iredell (Jan. 22, 1786), in 2 MCREE, supra note
214, at 133.
221. See Letter from Archibald Maclaine to James Iredell (Mar. 6, 1786), in 2 MCREE,
supra note 214, at 137-38. The judges had actually tried to give the Loyalists a chance on one
occasion, but "they learned that there was a clamor against them for the little good which
they attempted." Id. at 138. So they decided to enforce the act to the letter, and go even
further: "They believe that the Assembly will not censure them for misbehavior in office,
when their vengeance is aimed at a defenceless Tory." Id.
222. See 2 ASHE, supra note 219, at 4447,51; Kenneth M. Johnson, Paper, Province of the
Judge in Jury Trials, 12 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOCY 76, 78-79 (1928).
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judges.2 ' A committee of lawyers was appointed to investigate, and
it returned a report charging the judges with numerous offenses."M
In response, Judge Ashe wrote an open letter condemning the bar
and claiming that the lawyers, not the judges, were themselves
responsible for the failures of justice they described.225 Despite the
report, the legislature dismissed the charges 26 (concern for Tories
was hardly a popular cause), and hostility between the bench and
bar continued to fester. Problems continued because there was no
appeal from these judges' decisions; they were the trial and
appellate courts. 227 Not until 1818 did the North Carolina
legislature create a wholly separate supreme court with appellate
jurisdiction only.2
Ultimately, the lawyers succeeded in muzzling the judges, if not
in ousting them. The statute passed in 1796 states that judges are
forbidden in the charge to the jury to express any "opinion whether
a fact was fully or sufficiently proved, such matter being the true
office and province of the jury."2 29
While it seemed that the North Carolina bar had reason to
complain, their objectives could have been met more directly by
removing the offending judges. Popular pressure prevented this
course,2 30  so the indirect method of limiting comment
prevailed-possibly influenced by North Carolina's new sister state
Tennessee.
223. See 18 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 212-17, 421-25, 428 (Walter Clark ed.,
1900). This was evidently not the first time Hay had gone after the judges. Hay had
apparently initiated an earlier investigation into their misconduct which came to nought.
Then, too, Ashe defended himself in a letter that attacked the lawyers. Hooper wrote to
Iredell in January 1786: "This ridiculous pursuit of Hay's ended as we expected. It was
conceived in spleen, and conducted with such headstrong passion, that, after the charges
were made, evidence was wanting to support them." Letter from William Hooper to James
Iredell (Jan. 22, 1786), in 2 MCREE, supra note 214, at 133.
224. See Letter from Alfred Moore to James Iredell (Dec. 14, 1786), in 2 MCREE, supra
note 214, at 153-54; 18 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 223, at 212-17.
225. See 2 MCREE, supra note 214, app. at 601 n.1.
226. See 18 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 223, at 428.
227. See Battle, supra note 121, at 468-69.
228. See ASHE, supra note 219, at 261.
229. An Act to Secure the Impartiality of Trial by Jury, and to Direct the Conduct of
Judges in Charges to the Petit Jury, ch. IV, § 1, 1796 N.C. Laws 3.
230. See ASHE, supra note 219, at 51-53.
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2. Tennessee and Its Followers
The North Carolina statute seems to have been relatively little
known outside the state. Waterman described it in his treatise, and
urged other states to follow suit.2 1' Georgia's supreme court took
note of it in 1849.2" But few other mentions appear in legal
literature. The more prominent provision was that of the Tenn-
essee Constitution of 1796, drafted shortly before the enactment of
North Carolina's statute.23' Tennessee had been part of North
Carolina before it became a state in 1796, and many of its settlers
were North Carolinians.3 4 Indeed the 1796 Tennessee Constitution
was based on the North Carolina Constitution of 1776.35 It is not
surprising, then, that Tennessee and North Carolina should have
had similar provisions limiting judges.
At the Tennessee Constitutional Convention, the drafting
committee put in the article on the judiciary a provision restricting
the judge's charge: "The judges of the superior and inferior courts
shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state
the testimony and declare the law."2 36 It went through without
recorded debate. A number of lawyers were members of that
drafting committee, including Andrew Jackson himself, who was
active throughout the Tennessee convention.237 It would be
astonishing if their influence on the judiciary article, in particular,
were not profound.238
231. See 3 WATERMAN, supra note 58, at 729.
232. See Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324, 345 (1849).
233. The Tennessee Constitutional Convention assembled on January 11, 1796 and
adjourned on February 6, 1796, having completed drafting the state constitution. See
JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF A CONVENTION BEGAN AND HELD AT KNOXVILLE 1, 32
(Knoxville 1796). The North Carolina legislature convened at Raleigh on November 21,1796
and adjourned by December 25 of the same year. See List ofActs Passed, N.C. J. (Halifax),
Jan. 2, 1797, at 1; Supplement, ST. GAZETTE N.C. (Edenton), Jan. 12, 1797, at 1.
234. See RAMSEY, supra note 134, at 175.
235. See WALLACE MCCLURE, STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING, WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE
TOTENNESSEE 29-51 (1916); JAMES PHELAN, HISTORYOFTENNESSEE: THE MAKING OFA STATE
200 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1888).
236. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. V, § 5; see JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF A
CONVENTION BEGAN AND HELD AT KNOXVILLE , supra note 233, at 19.
237. See JOURNALOFTHE PROCEEDINGS OFACONVENTIONBEGANAND HELDATKNOXVILLE,
supra note 233, at 1.
238. That was certainly the case where we have more complete convention records. See
supra text accompanying note 119 (quoting Hall as pointing out that lawyers dominated the
committees on the judiciary and floor debates about the judiciary).
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The constitution of Tennessee was only the third state
constitution to be drawn up for a new state not part of the original
thirteen. 39 The Tennessee Constitution was widely praised and
thought to be a good model for other states.240 Jefferson declared it
to be "the least imperfect and most republican" of the state
constitutions to that date.24 ' Its provisions were often copied by the
new states that came after, and its provision on judicial comment
was no exception.
Among the earliest copying was that done by statute in
Mississippi and Alabama in 1802 when they were part of the
Mississippi Territory; they simply lifted the provision verbatim
from the Tennessee Constitution.242 In 1822, after Mississippi had
become a state, it modified the statute to make clear that any sort
of judicial opinion on evidence was banned.24' A further
modification in 1830 placed extraordinary limitations on the judge,
by far the strictest of the time: Judges were not allowed even to
sum up testimony, much less give their opinion on it, and could not
even charge the jury on law unless the parties agreed.2 "
239. See 27 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 474 (int'l ed. 1991). Vermont was the first,
admitted in 1791, followed by Kentucky in 1792. See id.
240. See RAMSEY, supra note 134, at 657.
241. Id.
242. See An Act More Effectually to Secure the Rights and Interests of the Citizens of this
Territory, § 4, 1802 Miss. Terr. Acts 3, 4 (codified at MISS. TERR. STAT. pt. V, ch. II, § 5
(1807)); WILLIAM WARREN ROGERS ET AL., ALABAMA: THE HISTORY OF A DEEP SOUTH STATE
at xxi (1994) (noting that Alabama was part of the Mississippi Territory).
243. See An Act, to Reduce Into One, the Several Acts and Parts of Acts, Concerning the
Establishment, Jurisdiction and Powers of the Superior Courts of Law, § 144, 1822 Miss.
Laws 35,64 (codified at MiSS. REV. CODE ch. 13, § 144 (1824)) ("No judge ... shall charge the
jury as to the weight of evidence in any cause, civil or criminal, but such judge may sum up
the testimony and declare any matter of law arising thereon."). The act was passed as part
of code revisions and consolidations proposed by respected lawyer George Poindexter, who
had been appointed to the task by the legislature. See Governor's Message, MSS.
REPUBLICAN (Natchez), June 20, 1822, at 4 (discussing code revisions and consolidations).
On Poindexter, see DUNBAR ROWLAND, COURTS, JUDGES, AND LAWYERS OF MISSISSIPPI 1798-
1935, at 30-43 (1935). The legislature passed all the bills Poindexter offered but one-a bill
providing against champerty and maintenance. See The Legislature, GAZETTE (Natchez,
Miss.), July 6, 1822, at 2. Lawyers were thus left more latitude to ply their trade.
244. See An Act, to Amend an Act, Entitled an Act, to Reduce Into One, the Several Acts
and Parts of Acts Concerning the Establishment, Jurisdiction and Powers of the Superior
Courts of Law, Passed June 28th, 1822, at § 3, 1830 Miss. Laws 50, 50-51 (codified at MiSS.
STAT. ch. XL, §§ 9,53 (Howard & Hutchinson 1840)). The legislature was certainly mindful
of the infamous Judge Child during the same session it passed this 1830 modification. See
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Other states followed Tennessee's lead. Newly-admitted
Arkansas' constitution of 1836 contained an exact copy of the
Tennessee provision.245 Missouri, admitted in 1821, adopted a
Tennessee-type statute in 1845 for criminal cases.246 Texas,
admitted in 1845, adopted such a statute for both civil and criminal
cases right away in 1846.247 It seems likely that Florida, admitted
in 1845, and Iowa, admitted in 1846, which both adopted statutes
very similar to each other, 8 were influenced by the Tennessee
supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. The governor had recently nominated George
Poindexter to fill a vacant seat for Mississippi in the U.S. Senate, but the legislature had to
confirm the choice. The other candidate for the office was Judge Child. Poindexter won, 41
to 6. See Election Results, NATCHEZ GAZET=E (Natchez, Miss.), Dec. 1, 1830, at 3. One
newspaper correspondent reported, "It was understood here, that the Judge [Child] intended
to resign, and candidates started up like dragons' teeth. [The legislature elected judges at
that point.] But the Judge declined the idea of giving up his comfortable seat, from some
cause or other, which I do not undertake to assign." Id. It is possible that Judge Child's
refusal to resign encouraged the legislature to restrict judicial comment, There were also
problems with ajudge of the Criminal Court inAdams County that the legislature was asked
to address. See, e.g., Letter to the Editor from "Moderate," NATCHEZ (Natchez, Miss.), Nov.
20, 1830, at 372. The idea ofjudicial elections was also in the air at the same time, as the
legislature considered proposing a constitutional convention for the state. See Editorial,
Convention, PEARLRIVER ADVOC. & E. ADVERTISER (Monticello, Miss. ), Sept. 24, 1830, at 2
(arguing that judges in Mississippi should be elected every four years because legal studies
are calculated "to engender aristocratic feeling").
245. See ARK CONST. of 1836, art. VI, §12; JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONVENTION MET TO FORM A CONSTITUTION AND SYSTEM OF STATE GOVERNMENT FOR THE
PEOPLE OF ARKANSAS 11-13 (Little Rock 1836). The records of the Arkansas convention
record motions and votes, but not verbatim debates.
246. See Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 138, art. VI, § 28 (Jones 1845); 27 ENCYCLOPEDIAAMERICANA
474 (int'l ed. 1991) (noting Missouri's admission in 1821).
The court shall not ... sum up or comment upon the evidence, or charge the
jury as to matter of fact, unless requested so to do by the prosecuting attorney,
and the defendant or his counsel, but the court may instruct the jury on any
point of law arising in the cause ....
MO. REV. STAT. ch. 138, § 28.
247. See An Act Regulating Juries, § 25, 1846 Tex. Laws 170, 177 ("[N]o judge, in any
cause, civil or criminal, shall charge the jury upon the weight of evidence, but he may sum
up the testimony and shall charge the jury upon any matter of law arising thereon."); 27
ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 474 (int'l ed. 1991) (noting Texas' admission in 1845).
248. See An Act to Provide Writs of Error in Criminal Cases, § 8, 1847 Fla. Acts 8, 9
("[C]harges made by Judges to Juries... shall be exclusively on points of law...."); An Act
to Amend the Several Acts Regulating Judicial Proceedings, § 1, 1847 Fla. Acts 11, 12
(allowing the judge to "charge the Jury only upon the law of the case"); An Act Regulating
Practice in the District Courts of the Territory of Iowa, § 36, 1839 Iowa Terr. Stat. 370, 379
("The district court in charging the jury, shall only instruct them as to the law of the case.");
27 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 474 (int'l ed. 1991) (noting Florida's admission in 1845, and
Iowa's admission in 1846). The Code of Iowa adopted in 1851 contained stronger language.
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provision. Florida may also have been influenced by Illinois' statute
of 1845 for criminal cases: judges "shall only instruct as to the
law.
2 4 9
3. California: Regional Differences Among Lawyers at the
Convention
The most influential follower of Tennessee was California. In
September, 1849, a convention met to draft a constitution for the
soon-to-be-admitted state. We have a good idea of how the
Tennessee provision worked its way into the California Con-
stitution. The delegates felt the question of the judge's charge was
important enough to debate at length, and, unlike in the southern
states, the convention reporter transcribed the debates in admirable
detail.250
Regional differences turned up in the debates on this question.
Lawyers originally from southern states tended to support a strong
form of restricting judges, while lawyers of northern origin argued
to allow judges more leeway. Through and through, the debate ran
the question of the relative power and trustworthiness of counsel
and the trial judge, despite the efforts of one outspoken delegate to
focus on the jury.
The committee responsible for drafting an article on the judiciary
produced a version which contained no restriction on a judge's
I
See IOWA CODE § 1791 (1851) ("The charge of the court shall be confined strictly to matters
oflaw.. ").
249. ILL. STAT. ch. 83, § 36 (Gross 1868). Illinois added a further restriction on the trial
judge in 1847, with a statute prohibiting a judge from giving any instruction that was not
reduced to writing. See ILL. STAT. ch. 83, § 37; Humphreys v. Collier, 1 Ill. (Breese) 297, 298
n.2 (1829) (editor's note). These restrictions evidently came about because of the conduct of
Judge Thomas C. Browne, ajustice of the supreme court during the entire period while the
constitution of 1818 was in force (until the constitution of 1848 went into effect providing for
election ofjudges). See ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, §§ 3, 7, 17; James H. Cartwright, Present
but Taking No Part, 10 ILL L. REV. 537, 538 (1916). Judge Browne was not reputed for
learning in the law, but he reportedly did know how to get ajury verdict to match his views.
Lawyers complained that he would instruct a jury in such a way as to get a particular
verdict, and, when a bill of exceptions was presented to him for the appeal, he would refuse
to sign it and deny that he had instructed the jury as stated. See Cartwright, supra, at 538-
39. Leading lawyers on his circuit then went to the legislature for relief, and got the
restrictions passed. See Cartwright, supra, at 539; George M. Hogan, The Strangled Judge,
14 J. Ahi. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 116, 121 (1930).
250. See BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 151, at 234-39.
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charge.25' Very likely, this was because a leading light on that
committee was a relatively conservative lawyer from New York,
W.S. Sherwood, who would have been used to judges commenting
on evidence.5 2
Pacifus Ord, a delegate who supported various populist positions
throughout the debates, proposed an amendment taken verbatim
from the Tennessee Constitution: "Judges shall not charge juries
with respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and
declare the law."2 53 Immediately, the Virginian lawyer C.T. Botts
proposed a further amendment barfing judges from summing up
altogether." 4 Botts was an excitable populist given to grandiloquent
speeches about the rights of the people (and his own rights in the
convention) in the style of his fellow Virginian, Patrick Henry. The
other delegates' styles were considerably more down-to-earth, and
Botts's proposals met with little success.
In this case, Botts's amendment became a stalking horse that
distracted attention from the main proposal. He argued fiercely that
"great injustice" came from allowing judges to sum up the evidence;
a judge could use his interpretation of the facts to infect the jury
with his own biases.255 The jury was powerless to resist the
interpretation of the judge. Therefore, according to Botts, allowing
251. See id. at 212-13.
252. It should be noted that not all New Yorkers advocated the practice ofthat state when
they moved elsewhere. Edward Livingston was a New Yorker of a prominent legal family,
who drafted a proposed Code of Criminal Procedure for Louisiana in the 1820s. See 13
AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 149, at 763-64. The draft code stated
emphatically that the judge "shall not recapitulate the testimony unless requested so to do
by one or more of the jurors, if there should be any difference of opinion between them as to
any particular part of the testimony," and even then he was to confine his remarks strictly
to the part in question. EDWARD LIVINGSTON, A SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW FOR THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA, Code of Procedure, art. 354 (Pittsburgh, John I. Kay & Co. 1833) (1824). It was
"the intent of this article that the jury shall decide all questions of fact, in which is included
the credit due to the witnesses who have been sworn, unbiassed [sic] by the opinion of the
court." Id. Louisiana did not stray from the path Livingston had marked out; it prohibited
judicial comment on the evidence in both civil and criminal cases. See LA. CODE PRAC. CIV.
art. 516 (1825) ("In this charge the judge must limit himself to giving the jury a knowledge
of the laws . . . and he shall abstain from saying anything about the facts, or even
recapitulating them...."); LA. REV. STAT. CRIM. PROC. § 17 (1856).
253. BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 151, at 234; see also William Wirt Blume, California
Courts in Historical Perspective, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 121, 130 (1970) (summarizing the debate
over the proposal).
254. See BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 151, at 234-35.
255. See id.
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the judge to sum up violated the great principle of separation of law
and fact-the one for the judge, the other exclusively for the jury.5 6
Botts thus painted a picture of a struggle between judge and jury,
and left the lawyers out of the picture altogether.
Other delegates, though, quickly reminded him of the lawyers'
role. Sherwood, the New Yorker, said that the "impartial umpire"
of the judge summing up facts was absolutely necessary to
counteract the influence of partial counsel.257 In this he was echoing
the arguments of judges such as Judge Ruffin of North, Carolina.58
Even in the most learned bodies upon earth, "men of genius" were
capable of carrying away the majority by the influence of their
eloquence. 259 How much more might a talented lawyer be capable
of carrying away a jury, who in some cases were "not so well
informed."2 0 "If you refuse to this impartial umpire a recital of the
facts after a long trial, and after the eloquent speech of the District
Attorney, you probably send an innocent man to the scaffold."261
Several other delegates supported Sherwood's assessment of the
dangers of eloquent counsel. 2 One questioned Botts's assumption
that "the judge will not be an honest judge" and that juries could
resist the "eloquent appeals of the counsel" if they could not resist
the judge's statement of facts.2 63 Botts gave no coherent response to
these arguments about counsel.
Even those delegates who supported Botts left the rhetoric about
the jury to him, and concentrated instead on the judge and
counsel.2  Southerners tended to echo Botts's dim view ofjudges. 65
One native of Tennessee, who had also practiced law in Vicksburg,
Mississippi and at least one other southern state, told the
convention that the Tennessee provision came about because of the
impeachment of two high-handed judges there, which "involved the
State in great expense, and caused great excitement throughout the
256. See id. at 236-37.
257. See id. at 235.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
259. See BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 151, at 235.
260. Id.
261. Id- at 237.
262. See U at 235-36 (remarks of M. Norton); id. at 237-38 (remarks of W.E. Shannon).
263. Id. at 237 (remarks of W.E. Shannon).
264. See id. at 235 (remarks of P. Ord); id. at 237 (remarks of Mr. Hastings).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
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country."26 6 This was clearly mistaken: as explained above, the
Tennessee provision was part of the 1796 constitution. 6 7 It seems
that the Tennessean was referring to the impeachment of Judges
Joshua Haskell and Nathaniel W. Williams in 1831,268 but no one
at the convention knew any better.
Another lawyer-delegate said that he had witnessed many abuses
of the judge's power.269 Unlike Botts, however, he emphasized
counsel and not the jury. If the judge undertook to meddle in the
facts at all, .'he necessarily takes the place of counsel."27 ° It was
counsel's job to speak about the testimony, not the judge's.
Botts's proposal to prohibit judges from summing up facts was
ultimately defeated.2 1' To some extent, his proposal seems to have
deflected attention from the original proposal drawn from the
Tennessee Constitution, stating that judges may not "charge juries"
on questions of fact, but could summarize the testimony.2  That
provision ultimately passed.2 7 ' Even the lawyers who were most
opposed to Botts's proposal did not speak out against it. The New
Yorker Sherwood seemed to believe that the judge stating the facts
impartially would be enough of a check on counselY.2 4 As Botts
suggested, however, the line between summarizing on the one hand,
and "charging" or giving one's opinion on the other, could be thin.
The California legislature elaborated on the question in its civil
procedure legislation of 1851: "In charging the Jury the Court shall
state to them all matters of law.., and if it state the testimony of
the case, it shall also inform the Jury that they are the exclusive
judges of all questions of fact."27 5
266. BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 151, at 235 (remarks ofW.M. Gwin).
267. See supra text accompanying note 236.
268. See PHELAN, supra note 235, at 301. Phelan believed that life tenure for judges was
at the root of the problem: "Feeling secure in their seats, many of the judges had become so
high-handed and overbearing, and in many cases so neglectful of their duties, that a general
protest went up from the people as well as the bar." Id. Again, the bar seems to have been
closely involved in these impeachments.
269. See BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 151, at 237 (remarks of Mr. Hastings).
270. Id.
271. See id. at 239.
272. See id. at 234.
273. See id. at 239.
274. As Sherwood pointed out, counsel was always there to correct the judge if he made
a mistake as to the facts. See id. at 235, 237 (remarks of W.S. Sherwood).
275. An Act to Regulate Proceedings in Civil Cases, in the Courts of Justice of this State,
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Numerous states in the West adopted provisions either like that
of the California Constitution or the California statute.276 Looking
at the bare constitutional provision or the statute, one might
conclude that the debates were largely about judges and juries. In
fact, the main focus of interest was the relative roles of the judge
and counsel, and regional differences had a profound influence.
4. Limits on the Spread of Restrictions: The Case of
Pennsylvania
The parade of new states that had adopted constitutional
provisions or statutes limiting the judge's ability to comment on
evidence should not obscure the fact that a fair number of new
states did not adopt any such provision before the Civil War. These
included Kentucky (admitted 1792), Indiana (1816), Maine (1820),
Michigan (1837), Wisconsin (1848), and Minnesota (1858).277
Most of the original states in the North simply continued their
traditional practice of allowing the judge to comment on evidence.
The Pennsylvania legislature had an episode in 1842 when it
debated enacting a thoroughgoing bar on judges commenting on
evidence.7' The bill was ultimately defeated. We have the floor
speech of the sponsor of the bill, Representative Deford, which he
had published in the Pennsylvania Law Journal and the
Pennsylvania Reporter, a Jacksonian newspaper.279 The speech
opens a window on efforts in the North to restrict comment.
In Pennsylvania, tensions between the bench and at least a
segment of the bar had been rising. The bar (and apparently some
members of the public) were protesting vigorously against two
judges of the Court of General Sessions in Philadelphia, Barton and
§ 165, 1851 Cal. Stat. 51, 76.
276. See Krasity, supra note 17, at 604-05.
277. See 27 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 474 (int'l ed. 1991).
278. See Trial by Jury, supra note 36 at 105. The bill stated:
It shall not be lawful for any Court aforesaid to intimate or deliver to the jury,
upon the trial of any cause, an opinion on the facts, and it shall be matter of
reversal in every such case where the verdict of the jury is in favour of the
opinion given.
Id. The bill also required the charge to be reduced to writing and prohibited the judge from
saying anything to the jury beyond what was written down. See ic.
279. Remarks of Mr. Deford, PENN. REP. (Harrisburg), July 22, 1842, at 1.
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Conrad. These two were said to have engaged in "monstrous
usurpation of the powers which belong to the grand jury... and
subsequently to a petit jury."28 ' Deford was a lawyer who reported
the bill on behalf of a select committee.281 Deford praised the jury
as "the very secret of society itself," and wrongly claimed that it had
been founded by King Alfred. 2 He then inveighed at length against
a "judicial tyranny" that "approaches us unseen, with the
stealthiness of a midnight assassin."2"s This judicial tyranny was
none other than decisions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
allowing trial judges to give their opinion on the evidence at trial,
as long as they specified that the ultimate decision was for the jury.
According to Deford, these decisions were a radical break with the
common law. He latched unto the common law maxim that facts are
for the jury to decide and ignored actual common law practice.2 8
Yet, while Deford began by lauding the jury, his most vehement
arguments concerned counsel. "The only argument which I have
ever heard in favour of this new claim, is, that unless the judges
took upon themselves to direct the jury on the facts, ingenious
counsel would distort them and mislead the jurors!!"2 5 This
argument was "shallow" and "arrogant and assuming" for two
reasons. 28 First, "it takes for granted that the jury are ignorant and
incapable, and of course can be led in any direction."" 7 This was "a
slander upon the intelligence of thejury."'88 (Deford had said earlier
in the very same paragraph that "[tihe jury being in most cases
280. Editorial, Let Justice Be Done, Though the Heavens Fall, KEYSTONE (Harrisburg, Pa.),
July 6, 1842, at 1. Barton and Conrad were accused of administering justice in a highly
partial way, favoring their political supporters and the rich at the expense of their political
opponents and the poor. See id. As a result, the state legislature was urged to either
impeach the two judges or abolish the court on which they sat. See id.; see also Pennsylvania
Legislature, PUB. LEDGER & DAILY TRANSCRIPT (Philadelphia), July 7, 1842, at 3 (describing
bills and motions introduced); id. July 11, 1842, at 3 (same); id., July 13, 1842, at 3 (same).
Ultimately, a bill to abolish the court was defeated. See The Legislature, KEYSTONE
(Harrisburg, Pa.), July 14, 1842, at 2; Pennsylvania Legislature, PUB. LEDGER & DAILY
TRANSCRIPT (Philadelphia), July 16, 1842, at 3.
281. See id. at 104.
282. Id. at 99.
283. Id. at 104.
284. See id. at 101.
285. Id. at 102.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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plain men, are as naturally led to the adoption of the opinion of the
Court on the facts, as the sparks are to fly upwards, and render
their verdict accordingly."289)
Second, Deford said, it was false to assume that a judge could
control the influence of "the most ingenious lawyer" if his opposing
counsel could not.29 ' This was "bringing down the abilities and
talents of the bar to a level with every ignoramus, who by fraud or
accident may have got himself upon the bench-a position to which
I am mistaken if the bar of Pennsylvania at least, will ever
assent."29' The judges were incapable of controlling their courtrooms
and it was best to leave it to lawyers to control each other. If the
jury erred on the facts, the judge could always grant a new trial;
comment was entirely unnecessary. (Deford did not explain why an
ignoramus judge could be trusted to grant a new trial fairly.)
Deford made it clear that his ideal was a judge who was virtually
silent at trial; he held up as an example a judge he had seen on the
bench in Virginia who never said anything at all to the jury unless
counsel disagreed on the law.
292
But all of Deford's eloquence could not save the bill. Before the
vote on the question, the legislature had "a pretty lengthy
discussion"-unfortunately not reported-and the bill failed 52-29.93
5. Change Among the Original States: The Cases of Georgia
and Massachusetts
Of the original states that did not adopt restrictions on comment
early on, only Georgia and Massachusetts changed-both against the
wishes of the judiciary. In 1849, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld
the power to comment in Potts v. House.2 94 Citing English and New
York' precedents, the Georgia court said such comment was a
matter of discretion, with the trial judge and would not be closely
scrutinized on appeal. 95 The court went on to mention the North
289. Id
290. Id. at 103.
291. Id.
292. See id.
293. PennsylvaniaLegislature, PUB. LEDGER&DAiLYTRANSCRiPT (Philadelphia), July 16,
1842, at 3.
294. 6 Ga. 324 (1849).
295. See id. at 344-45.
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Carolina statute, impliedly criticizing its assumptions that the
judge's opinion on the facts encroached on the powers of the jury "in
every case" and that the jury would never question the judge's
assessment.296 To bolster its implied view that the jury was not so
pliable as that, the Georgia court declared, "the general diffusion of
knowledge and education among the people of this country, much
better fits them for weighing and compairing [sic] the evidence,than
in any other nation or age since the institution of trial by Jury."297
But the Georgia legislature either took this the wrong way, as an
invitation to copy the North Carolina statute, or it consciously went
against the wishes of the judiciary and enacted a verbatim copy the
following year.29' This would seem to be the North Carolina
statute's only direct progeny. Georgia eventually fit in with its
southern neighbors.
The Massachusetts statute was a regional anomaly, born of a
covert personal battle with the judiciary. Benjamin Butler, a radical
state representative, developed a grudge against thejudiciary when
he was attacked in a newspaper editorial and sued for libel.29 9 The
conservative presiding judge told the jury that the evidence did not
warrant conviction, and the jury acquitted the newspaper.300 A few
years later, in 1854, the still-fuming Butler inserted a Tennessee-
type restriction on judges' ability to comment on evidence into a
piece of legislation having to do with another subject altogether.3 °'
In Justice Holmes' words, he "ran the thing through." °2
Butler's sly tactics explain how such a piece of legislation could
be enacted in Massachusetts, where the legal culture was so
296. Id. at 345.
297. Id. at 345.
298. See An Act to Prevent Judges of the Several Superior Courts in this State from
Making Certain Charges or Giving their Opinions to or in Hearing of the Jury, and to Define
the Same as Error, § 1, 1850 Ga. Acts. 271, 271-72 (codified at GA. STAT. JUD. § 47 (Cobb
1851)) ("[No Judge shall] express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been
proved. . . ."). Krasity interprets the opinion differently. See Krasity, supra note 17, at 600,
616.
299. See Richard W. Hale, Remarks of Richard W. Hale, Esq., at Bench and Bar Night
Upon the History of the Statute Forbidding Judges to Charge Upon the Facts, MASS. L.Q.,
Jan. 1926, at 57, 57-58.
300. See id. at 58.
301. See MASS. GEN. STAT. ch. 115, § 5 (1861); Hale, supra note 299, at 58-59.
302. Hale, supra note 299, at 59.
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antithetical to such restrictions.3 ' Massachusetts was also
surrounded by states with strong judges who freely commented on
evidence."0 4 The legislation seems much more in keeping with
Georgia's culture and its surrounding states.
B. The Reaction of the Courts
How did courts react to these new provisions? The courts'
reactions varied considerably, but in the end most seem to have put
more emphasis on the formal remedy of new trial. In one respect
they did not differ. In the case of statutes, judges did not attempt'
to declare them unconstitutional under state constitutional
provisions securing the right to trial by jury. It would not seem to
have been impossible to argue that trial by jury included as an
essential element a judge's summing up and commenting on facts.
As Kenneth Krasity pointed out, the United States Supreme Court
said as much in 1929 in Patton v. United States:
[W]e first inquire what is embraced by the phrase "trial by
jury." That means a trial by jury as understood and applied at
common law, and includes all the essential elements as they
were recognized in this country and England when the
Constitution was adopted, is not open to question. Those
elements were-(1) that the jury should consist of twelve men,
neither more nor less; (2) that the trial should be in the
presence and under the superintendence of a judge having
power to instruct them as to the law and advise them in respect
of the facts; and (3) that the verdict should be unanimous.0 5
But Patton was decided after the vigorous movement by the likes of
the American Judicature Society to restore judicial authority had
been underway for several decades.0 6 In the early and mid-
nineteenth century, the tide was not running that way.
Furthermore, judges in the first half of the nineteenth century were
not so willing to strike down legislation as unconstitutional as they
303. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
304. See supra p. 28 tbl. 1.
305. 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1929); see Krasity, supra note 17, at 607.
306. See Introduction, 1 J.AI. JUDICATURE Soc'y3, 3-4 (1917) (discussing the history and
founding principles of the Society).
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later became. The use ofjudicial review was growing, but still quite
rare. 17 The issue does not seem to have been argued by counsel,
and judges seem not to have suggested it.
This did not mean the judges were utterly powerless against such
legislation if they were of a mind to limit it. This could be done in
various ways. At least up to 1822, it seems that judges in North
Carolina could in effect comment on evidence as long as they added
the tag "if the jury believe the witness.""8 The key thing, according
to the North Carolina Supreme Court in the 1821 case Sneed v.
Creath, was that the jury "feel themselves at liberty to estimate the
weight of the evidence."" 9 But a year later in Executors of Reel v.
Reel, the court clamped down much harder on the practice, in effect
saying that the trial judge could intimate no opinion whatever on
the facts. 10 "It is not for this Court to discuss the wisdom or
expediency of this law.... It is the will of the Legislature, and we
are bound to obey it."
3 1
'
There was also the possibility of converting questions of fact into
questions of law. Judges preserved their power to direct a verdict,
even under the statutes or constitutional provisions limiting
comment. Sometimes they were rather coy about this, as the
Arkansas Supreme Court was in Hynson v. Terry in 1838.312 There,
307. The U.S. Supreme Court was also quiet in this respect during the Jacksonian era;
between Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), the Court invalidated no federal legislation. See Barry Friedman,
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 389-90 (1998).
308. Sneed v. Creath, 8 N.C. 157, 159, 1 Hawks 307, 312 (1821).
309. Id. In a suit on a debt where the defense was that it was already paid, the defendant
called his brother William, a minister, to testify for him. See id. at 157, 1 Hawks at 309-10.
Another witness said that William had been drunk when he saw what he was testifying
about, and William denied it with an explanation of why she might have thought he was
drunk. See id. at 158, 1 Hawks at 310. The judge charged the jury that"it did not appear that
the witness William had any inducement to commit a perjury, that.., they ought in charity
to believe the witness; that there was nothing to impeach his testimony." Id. at 158-59, 1
Hawks at 311. The charge passed muster with the North Carolina Supreme Court as not
violating the statute. See id. at 159, 1 Hawks at 311-12. The North Carolina Supreme Court
did draw the line at the instruction that the witness's "being a preacher it ought to add
weight to his evidence," but on the grounds that it was not automatically true, not that it
violated the statute. Id. A new trial was granted because of that instruction. See id.
310. 9 N.C. 52, 52-53, 2 Hawks 63, 86-87 (1822).
311. Id. at 52, 2 Hawks at 86.
312. 1 Ark. 83 (1838).
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the judge charged the jury that "from the law in this case, the court
was of opinion that the plaintiff had not made out such a case as
would enable him to recover, but that the facts were with the
jury."  The Arkansas Supreme Court approved: 'The Judge leaves
the matters of fact where the Constitution places them, for the
consideration and judgment of the jury, and he merely declares his
opinion of the law of the case, which he is bound to do under the
most sacred obligations of his office." 14 The court then went on to
point out that there were no facts for the jury anyway; the plaintiff
had not alleged that there was a gift in writing, as required for gifts
of slaves under Arkansas law. 3
15
Chief Justice Sharkey, the powerful and respected head of the
Mississippi Supreme Court, 16 was much more forthright about the
trial court's power to direct a verdict. In Perry v. Clarke in 1841, he
acknowledged the Mississippi statute's prohibition on commenting
on evidence. 17
But at the same time it must be the prerogative of the court to
determine whether the evidence conduces to prove the issue,
otherwise a party might introduce whatever matter he pleased,
and the court could not object: its power would be wholly
paralyzed in regard to the introduction of evidence.1i
The court would back up this power to direct a verdict by granting
new trials: If the verdict had gone the other way, with or without
instructions, "can it be supposed for a moment that the verdict
would have been permitted to stand? It cannot! The court could not
have hesitated in granting a new trial.31 9
While most courts chafed under the constitutional or statutory
restrictions, some seemed to glory in them. A few state appellate
courts thought these restrictions were needed to protect "the
313. Id. at 84 (quoting lower court).
314. Id. at 86.
315. See id. at 88-89.
316. On Sharkey's extraordinary career as a Whig Unionist and elected politician in
Mississippi, see FOOTE, supra note 139, at 61-70; ROWLAND, supra note 243, at 87-92.
317. 4 Miss. 199, 201, 5 Howard 495, 501 (1841).
318. Id. at 200, 5 Howard at 499.
319. Id. at 202, 5 Howard at 502.
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province of the jury."32° The Iowa Supreme Court, in its first year or
so of existence, denounced the common law practice of comment,
declaring that "this practice was frequently carried to so alarming
an extent that the jury became but mere machines in the hands of
the court to reflect back the verdict which the court would more
than intimate." 21 It praised the legislature for deciding to "protect
the people against any interference of the court," and stated that
"[t]he only safe rule is to confine the courts to the law." 22 If courts
were permitted to charge on facts, "it would be an invasion upon the
trial by jury, which is so much favored in this country; the tendency
of which would be mischievous, unjust and oppressive."323 Notably,
Iowa did not follow the nisiprius system, where the trial judges and
appellate judges were the same people; the Iowa Supreme Court
judges were separate from the trial judges. 24
A few states even seem to have barred or at least discouraged
judicial comment on the evidence by judicial decision alone, without
a constitutional provision or statute. These include Maryland
(1815), Missouri (1826), Ohio (1849), and Virginia (1854).25 Virginia
had never been hospitable to the practice of judges giving their
opinion on the weight of evidence,3 26 and the 1854 decision of the
Supreme Court of Appeals in McDowell's Ex'or v. Crawford
confirms existing practice there. 2' Deford gave a good illustration
320. Newnam's Lessee v. City of Cincinnati, 18 Ohio 323, 334 (1849).
321. Frederick v. Gaston, 1 Greene 401, 404 (Iowa 1848).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 5, §§ 3-4.
325. See Krasity, supra note 17, at 605-06.
326. See Hardaway v. Manson, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 230, 234 (1811) (stating that "the weight
of the evidence.., was a question belonging exclusively to the jury"); Fisher's Ex'r v. Duncan
& Turnbull, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 563, 577 (1807) (opinion of Fleming, J.) (prohibiting the
judge from expressing an opinion on the sufficiency of the evidence).
327. 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 377, 402-06 (1854); see also Berry v. Ensell, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 333,
338 (1845) (reversing lower court for use of an instruction that precluded the jury from
weighing the evidence themselves); Gregory v. Baugh, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 665, 693 (1831)
(reversing lower court for use of an instruction designed to mislead them as to a matter of
fact); 1 CONWAY ROBINSON, THE PRACTICE IN THE CouRTs OF LAW AND EQuITY IN VIRGINIA
338-44 (Richmond, Samuel Shepherd & Co. 1832) (M"e... cases evince a jealous care to
watch over and protect the legitimate powers of the jury."). The Virginia court, unlike that
of Massachusetts, also appeared to be very strict about the trial judge submitting a proper
report of the case to the appellate court; otherwise, the judgment would be reversed. See
McDowell's Ex'r, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) at 397-401.
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of the silent Virginia judge in his 1842 speech to the Pennsylvania
legislature. 8
The Supreme Court of Missouri somewhat casually observed, in
LaBeaume v. Dodier in 1826, that "[i]t is not the province of a court
to say, testimony before a jury is insufficient to prove a fact in
issue."29 In that case, the supreme court disagreed with the trial
court's characterization of the evidence as insufficient in any
event." Missouri enacted a Tennessee-type statute for criminal
cases in 1845,331 but the supreme court seems not to have bothered
citing it, even in relevant cases.
3 3 2
In Ohio, the courts considered the subject somewhat more deeply
(though without relying on outside authority). Ohio's highest court
had allowed trial judges to comment on evidence,3 3 3 but then
prohibited the practice in 1849.33' The Ohio court held that even if
"it is apparent that right and justice have been done-that another
trial must result in a similar verdict" the judgment would be
reversed. 35 Allowing a judge to comment on the evidence was no
"mere technical error."336 Rather, "we look upon it as an invasion,
by the court, of the province of the jury, which should always be
guarded against."337 If the jury went astray, the judge could always
pull out the weapon of new trial.3 38 This seems to be a nonsensical
result, causing expense without any gain. New trial was not a cheap
remedy. But it did preserve the illusion of jury power, and it did
allow the lawyers to fight and be paid for another round.
328. See supra text accompanying note 292. Interestingly, the silent judge Deford
described sat in Morgantown, in what is now West Virginia. See Trial by Jury, supra note
36, at 103. It is possible that the greater populism of the piedmont, as opposed to the more
aristocratic tidewater, led to quieter judges.
329. 1 Mo. 335, 336 (1826).
330. See id.
331. See Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 138, art. VI, § 28 (Jones 1845).
332. See State v. Homes, 17 Mo. 379,382 (1852) (responding to the trial judge's refusal to
give a requested instruction calling the jurors' attention to certain facts by noting- "It is no
error to fail to do this").
333. See Abram's Lessee v. Will, 6 Ohio 165, 165-66 (1833).
334. See Newnam's Lessee v. City of Cincinnati, 18 Ohio 323, 333 (1849).
335. Id. at 334.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., id.
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CONCLUSION
American practice in many states in the first half of the
nineteenth century shows that the American jury system could
easily accommodate judges commenting on evidence. Juries were
free to reject the judge's opinion when they saw fit, thus preserving
their separate sphere of authority, but had the benefit of judicial
guidance. Tocqueville, Wigmore, and others, far from viewing
judicial comment as a major impediment to jury trial, saw it as
absolutely necessary to its proper functioning. The culture of the
South and West, however, was far less conducive to such comment.
Certain lawyers in those areas managed to put in place restrictions
on the power that suited their interests in controlling trial and in
moving the jury with intensely emotional rhetoric. The mechanism
for controlling the jury that ultimately won out was new trial, a
formal and expensive method.
The regional difference in restrictions on comment was so
pronounced before the Civil War that it could not have been pure
accident alone that led some states to adopt restrictions while
others did not. It is apparent that legal and social culture played a
considerable role. To what extent might our culture today be
hospitable or inhospitable to judges commenting on evidence? Some
preliminary observations are in order.
Our society is of course in some respects quite different from that
of the South and West before the Civil War. Government officials
have far more resources at their disposal to maintain order and
enforce the law. This in turn leads to greater respect for (or, at
least, fear of) government authority, including judicial authority.
Although we are in the habit of complaining about growing violence
and lack of civility, today lawyers and politicians do not shoot each
other on a regular basis, and courtrooms rarely are the scene of
rowdy, drunken crowds and equally drunken lawyers and judges
trading colorful insults.
The nature of civil cases also has changed, as commerce,
technology, and the laws that govern them have become
increasingly specialized and complicated. Civil cases today are often
so complex and confusing that jurors would be grateful for more
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guidance from the judge. These changes suggest that judges would
be better able to exercise powers of comment.
Other changes that have occurred since the Civil War, however,
dim the prospects for a vigorous power of judicial comment. These
changes concern the probable reasons why restrictions on the power
to comment spread beyond the South and West after the war.
Appellate courts have proved themselves very reluctant to allow
trial judges to comment on the evidence. 39 This is so for a number
of reasons. The personnel of appellate courts and trial courts are
now different. In the early nineteenth century, when many states
(and the federal Supreme Court) followed the nisiprius system and
trial judges were simply appellate judges sitting singly, appellate
judges were not anxious to limit their own power as trial judges.
When states separated the personnel of trial and appellate courts,
there was less hesitation about limiting someone else's power. 40
In addition, when they abandoned the nisi prius system, states
created a strong hierarchy ofjudicial officers. Trial judges' pay was
lower and their formal qualifications less stringent. 41 Appellate
courts were therefore encouraged to believe they should exercise
considerable control over these "inferior" courts. 42 Coming on top
of these developments was a new technology that allowed appellate
courts to get an exact transcript of what was said at trial:
stenography.' 48 No longer would there be ambiguity about what was
said or done at trial; losing counsel could pore over a transcript and
point out a trial judge's arguable errors or misstatements in great
detail to appellate judges. The result was that trial judges were
prevented from maintaining a more relaxed, informal relationship
with the jury that fostered comment on evidence.
Perhaps the most important factor of all in preventing trial
judges from exercising the power to comment is one that is not too
different from the situation in the South and West before the Civil
339. See supra note 47.
340. See HURST, supra note 17, at 98-100.
341. See id.
342. See id. at 98, 101-02.
343. See id. at 103-04. Stenography was invented around the time of the Civil War and
shortly thereafter states began to pass laws providing for court reporters to make official
stenographic transcripts. By 1868, for example, New York was using court stenographers.
See N.Y. CODE PROC. § 256 (Townsend 1868).
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War: an aggressive legal profession with political clout. Economic
analysis suggests that the more uncertain the outcome of trial is,
and the more dependent on their own skill, the more money lawyers
are likely to make.3" National organizations such as the American
Bar Association and the American Trial Lawyers' Association,
together with a host of local bar associations, make sure that
lawyers' voices are heard in the political arena. These organizations
have been unfriendly to judges taking an active role at trial. 5 In
addition, in some states lawyers' contributions to judicial
campaigns ensure that judges will be reluctant to offend lawyers
who regularly practice before them. Judges in these states would
probably prefer not to comment on evidence if possible, to avoid
offending actual or potential campaign supporters, and would
rather just leave the case silently to the jury."
Is it possible now to curb such an aggressive, lucrative legal
profession, to persuade appellate judges that trial judges may be
trusted to comment on evidence fairly, and to encourage trial judges
to exercise this power appropriately? Care in training trial judges
and in making sure they are not beholden to lawyers for political
support may help. At the very least, we should be armed against
rhetoric that jury power and democracy require that the trial judge
remain silent. There is no such necessity in our traditions; the
American jury system does not require a silent judge.
344. See supra note 121. It should be noted that this is true for both the plaintiffs' and
defense bar; the two have more interests in common than is generally supposed. See Posner,
supra note 121, at 433-34.
345. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASSN, CrVIL TRIAL PRACTICE STANDARDS, Standard 10 at 26-28
(1998) (advocating a tightly circumscribed role for the trial judge and emphasizing the
importance of counsel for the parties).
346. Thoughtful observers would rightly worry about giving such judges the power to
comment on evidence in any event, fearing that it would be used to support the most
important contributor.
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